Document Wi-Fi Fingerprinting Mitigation
Until the Wi-Fi fingerprinting issue is closed, the documentation should give users a mitigation, because this attack can lead to deanonymization.
The Capulcu collective (@counterflow) wrote an overview of this problem with a recommended mitigation in German, and it was recently translated by AnarSec.
Recommendation: Until there is a (stable) solution for the "WLAN fingerprinting" problem, you should remove the internal WLAN adapter for particularly sensitive research and publications and use a (cheap) external USB WLAN adapter and dispose of it after use. We also advise you to use WLAN adapters that can be controlled by the Tails operating system without manufacturer-specific firmware (e.g. WLAN adapters with Qualcomm's Atheros chip that use the ath9k driver).
The concrete example they give is also worth highlighting:
A concrete example: Due to previous police surveillance, a café in your city is suspected of being used for the publication of communiques. The café operator has allowed himself to be bribed or coerced by the cops into configuring his (commercially available) Internet router in such a way that it logs all of the data packets of all computers seeking contact. If the presence of various laptops in this café was 'recorded' at the same time as an explosive Indymedia publication, this could be used for further investigations, despite the fact that the content of the data packets only shows that the data was anonymized using Tor. If your computer was logged (despite a spoofed MAC address) and if the fingerprint of your WLAN adapter turns up again elsewhere (by chance, or through targeted investigations - e.g. during a house raid) and can be proven as belonging to you, a prosecutor could try to use this as evidence of you submitting the Indymedia publication.