Is user separation enough to hide Tor state from Vidalia?
_Originally created by @anonym on [#9366 (Redmine)](https://public-redmine-archive.tails.boum.org/code/issues/9366)_
While the primary reason for Vidalia running as a separate user is that
it needs full access to the control port, which leak all Tor circuit
state (tails/tails#9365) but also more dangerous stuff like the Tor process idea
of the external IP address. However, since Vidalia is an X application,
perhaps some X protocol magic can be used by a compromised application
(under the amnesia user) to interact with Vidalia (and hence its full
access to the control port) via some X protocol magic?
### Related issues
- **Related to** tails/tails#9365
- **Related to** tails/tails#7072
- **Related to** tails/tails#9001
issue