_Originally created by @intrigeri on [#9001 (Redmine)](https://public-redmine-archive.tails.boum.org/code/issues/9001)_ One of my main motivations to remove Vidalia is to get rid of this “one X application has full control over Tor” situation, so it would be good if Tor Monitor was only allowed to get the information it needs, as opposed to being allowed to do everything such as configure a well-chosen set of M attacker-controlled bridges and de-anonymize the user (with precision = N bits, given N total bridges controlled by the attacker). As of 20150220, Tor Monitor directly uses: - GETINFO circuit-status - GETINFO stream-status - GETINFO ip-to-country It also uses Stem, that probably sends more control commands to Tor. Feature Branch: feature/7870-include_onionshare ### Related issues - **Related to** tails/tails#9366 - **Related to** tails/tails#9365 - **Related to** tails/tails#8927 - **Related to** tails/tails#6742 - **Related to** tails/tails#11542 - **Related to** tails/tails#11826 - **Has duplicate** tails/tails#10058 - **Blocks** tails/tails#11197