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  • #7072

Research potential for deanonymization by a compromised "amnesia" user

Originally created by @intrigeri on #7072 (Redmine)

We already deny access to the Tor control port from the “amnesia” user. Still, there are possibly other ways, for a compromised “amnesia” user, to deanonymize the Tails user, e.g.:

  • taking control of Vidalia (that is running as a dedicated user, but inside a X session controlled by the “amnesia” one), and using its access to the Tor control port; e.g. a selection of bridges picked by the attacker is probably enough to deanonymize the user.
  • using NetworkManager, e.g. to get a list of Wi-Fi access points around
  • more?

Subtasks

  • #15635 (closed)
  • #17929

Related issues

  • Related to #6549
  • Related to #9366 (closed)
  • Has duplicate #5505 (closed)
Edited Oct 18, 2020 by intrigeri
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