Consider creating a persistence by default for plausible deniability
Originally created by Tails on #5929 (Redmine)
The "Warnings about persistence" page states "The persistent volume is not hidden. An attacker in possession of the USB stick can know that there is a persistent volume on it."
If every Tails USB stick had a persistent volume automatically created (with a random passphrase not known to the user), there would be no way to tell that the user had set up a persistent volume rather than just leaving the automatically created one in place. This would mean that a user who had created a persistent volume could plausibly claim that he/she hadn’t.
Of course, this wouldn’t protect against being tricked, and will be of at best variable efficiency against ‘rubber-hose cryptanalysis’, but it would be useful in a country like the UK where a court can compel you, on penalty of imprisonment, to reveal cryptographic keys and passphrases if it can prove that you know them.
- Related to #6621
- Related to #7269 (closed)
- Related to #7544 (closed)
- Related to #8861 (closed)
- Related to #11679 (closed)
- Related to #15292 (closed)
- Related to #15653 (closed)
- Related to #16485 (closed)
- Has duplicate #7541 (closed)
- Has duplicate #7630 (closed)
- Has duplicate #11076 (closed)
- Has duplicate #16750 (closed)
- Has duplicate #17579 (closed)