wget may expose user IP address with FTP protocol (CVE-2015-7665)
I’ve attached a patch that should address this according to the comments from that thread. However, I have not explicitly set up an FTP server to test the attack and the fix. I won’t be in a position to do so for a week or so, but would greatly appreciate if someone else would do that.
A bit of explanation for the patch, I’m using dpkg-divert to move the
wget binary to /usr/share/tails/wget to remove it from $PATH. I
originally tried moving it to /usr/bin/wget-real, but then noticed that
invoking wget w/o any args exposes the true binary name:
wget-real: missing URL
Usage: wget-real [OPTION]… [URL]…
Try `wget-real —help’ for more options.
That isn’t great, but it’s also scary to have wget itself in $PATH (i.e., some debian packaged binary may call /usr/bin/wget directly, which would bypass torsocks!). In light of this, I thought it prudent to move it out of $PATH, and /usr/share/tails seemed like an appropriate place, though I’m open to discussion on that.
- Copied to #10365