Commit f8b1d8ba authored by amnesia's avatar amnesia
Browse files

updated PO files

parent 797e25c6
......@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
msgid ""
msgstr ""
"Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n"
"POT-Creation-Date: 2011-11-20 16:40+0100\n"
"POT-Creation-Date: 2012-01-09 20:57+0100\n"
"PO-Revision-Date: YEAR-MO-DA HO:MI+ZONE\n"
"Last-Translator: FULL NAME <EMAIL@ADDRESS>\n"
"Language-Team: LANGUAGE <LL@li.org>\n"
......@@ -26,15 +26,15 @@ msgid ""
"Even though we're doing our best to offer you good tools to protect your "
"privacy while using a computer, **there is no magic or perfect solution to "
"such a complex problem**. Understanding well the limits of such tools is a "
"crucial step in, first, deciding whether Tails is the right tool for you, and "
"second, helping you making a good use of it."
"crucial step in, first, deciding whether Tails is the right tool for you, "
"and second, helping you making a good use of it."
msgstr ""
"Obwohl wir unser bestes geben um dir gute Werkzeuge anzubieten die deine "
"Privatsphäre schützen während du einen Computer benutzt, **gibt es keine "
"Magie und keine Perfekte Lösung zu einem solch komplexen Problem**. Die "
"Grenzen dieser Werkzeuge zu verstehen ist ein sehr wichtiger Schritt um "
"erstens zu entscheiden ob Tails das Richtige für dich ist, und zweitens hilft "
"es dir Tails sinnvoll einzusetzen."
"erstens zu entscheiden ob Tails das Richtige für dich ist, und zweitens "
"hilft es dir Tails sinnvoll einzusetzen."
#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
......@@ -55,8 +55,8 @@ msgstr ""
msgid ""
"Instead of taking a direct route from source to destination, communications "
"using the Tor network take a random pathway through several Tor relays that "
"cover your tracks. So no observer at any single point can tell where the data "
"came from or where it's going."
"cover your tracks. So no observer at any single point can tell where the "
"data came from or where it's going."
msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
......@@ -67,12 +67,12 @@ msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"The last relay on this circuit, called the exit node, is the one that "
"establishes the actual connection to the destination server. As Tor does not, "
"and by design cannot, encrypt the traffic between an exit node and the "
"establishes the actual connection to the destination server. As Tor does "
"not, and by design cannot, encrypt the traffic between an exit node and the "
"destination server, **any exit node is in a position to capture any traffic "
"passing through it**. See [Tor FAQ: Can exit nodes eavesdrop on "
"communications?](https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/"
"TorFAQ#CanexitnodeseavesdroponcommunicationsIsntthatbad)."
"communications?](https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/"
"TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#CanexitnodeseavesdroponcommunicationsIsntthatbad)."
msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
......@@ -81,7 +81,8 @@ msgid ""
"e-mail messages sent by foreign embassies and human rights groups around the "
"world by spying on the connections coming out of an exit node he was "
"running. See [Wired: Rogue Nodes Turn Tor Anonymizer Into Eavesdropper's "
"Paradise.](http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2007/09/embassy_hacks)."
"Paradise.](http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2007/09/"
"embassy_hacks)."
msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
......@@ -137,8 +138,8 @@ msgid ""
"A man-in-the-middle attack (MitM) is a form of active eavesdropping in which "
"the attacker makes independent connections with the victims and relays "
"messages between them, making them believe that they are talking directly to "
"each other over a private connection, when in fact the entire conversation is "
"controlled by the attacker."
"each other over a private connection, when in fact the entire conversation "
"is controlled by the attacker."
msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
......@@ -183,14 +184,31 @@ msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"But on top of that the certificate authorities model of trust on Internet is "
"susceptible to various methods of compromise. For example, in March 15, 2011, "
"Comodo, one of the major SSL certificates company, reported that a user "
"account with an affiliate registration authority had been compromised. It was "
"then used to create a new user account that issued nine certificate signing "
"requests for seven domains: mail.google.com, login.live.com, www.google.com, "
"login.yahoo.com (three certificates), login.skype.com, addons.mozilla.org, "
"and global trustee. See [Comodo: The Recent RA Compromise](http://blogs."
"comodo.com/it-security/data-security/the-recent-ra-compromise/)."
"susceptible to various methods of compromise."
msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"For example, on March 15, 2011, Comodo, one of the major SSL certificates "
"company, reported that a user account with an affiliate registration "
"authority had been compromised. It was then used to create a new user "
"account that issued nine certificate signing requests for seven domains: "
"mail.google.com, login.live.com, www.google.com, login.yahoo.com (three "
"certificates), login.skype.com, addons.mozilla.org, and global trustee. See "
"[Comodo: The Recent RA Compromise](http://blogs.comodo.com/it-security/data-"
"security/the-recent-ra-compromise/)."
msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"Later in 2011, DigiNotar, a Dutch SSL certificate company, incorrectly "
"issued certificates to a malicious party or parties. Later on, it came to "
"light that they were apparently compromised months before or perhaps even in "
"May of 2009 if not earlier. Rogues certificates were issued for domains such "
"as google.com, mozilla.org, torproject.org, login.yahoo.com and many more. "
"See, [The Tor Project: The DigiNotar Debacle, and what you should do about "
"it](https://blog.torproject.org/blog/diginotar-debacle-and-what-you-should-"
"do-about-it)."
msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
......@@ -202,8 +220,8 @@ msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"On one hand, by providing anonymity, Tor makes it more difficult to perform a "
"man-in-the-middle attack targeted at **one specific person** with the "
"On one hand, by providing anonymity, Tor makes it more difficult to perform "
"a man-in-the-middle attack targeted at **one specific person** with the "
"blessing of a rogue SSL certificate. But on the other end, Tor makes it "
"easier for people or organizations running exit nodes to perform large scale "
"MitM attempts, or attacks targeted at **a specific server**, and especially "
......@@ -244,10 +262,10 @@ msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"Tor tries to protect against traffic analysis, where an attacker tries to "
"learn whom to investigate, but Tor can't protect against traffic confirmation "
"(also known as end-to-end correlation), where an attacker tries to confirm an "
"hypothesis by monitoring the right locations in the network and then doing "
"the math."
"learn whom to investigate, but Tor can't protect against traffic "
"confirmation (also known as end-to-end correlation), where an attacker tries "
"to confirm an hypothesis by monitoring the right locations in the network "
"and then doing the math."
msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
......@@ -265,10 +283,11 @@ msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"The documents that you might save on storage devices will not be encrypted by "
"default. But Tails provides you with tools to encrypt your documents, such as "
"GnuPG, or encrypt your storage device, such as LUKS. It is likely that the "
"files you may create will keep tracks that they were created using Tails."
"The documents that you might save on storage devices will not be encrypted "
"by default. But Tails provides you with tools to encrypt your documents, "
"such as GnuPG, or encrypt your storage device, such as LUKS. It is likely "
"that the files you may create will keep tracks that they were created using "
"Tails."
msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
......@@ -285,10 +304,11 @@ msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"Numerous files format store hidden data or metadata inside of the files. Text "
"processors or PDF files could store the name of the author, the date and time "
"of creation of the file, and sometimes even parts of the editing history of "
"the file… those hidden data depend on the file format and the software used."
"Numerous files format store hidden data or metadata inside of the files. "
"Text processors or PDF files could store the name of the author, the date "
"and time of creation of the file, and sometimes even parts of the editing "
"history of the file… those hidden data depend on the file format and the "
"software used."
msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
......@@ -296,11 +316,11 @@ msgid ""
"Images file formats, like TIFF of JPEG, probably take the prize in this "
"field. Those files, created by digital cameras or mobile phones, contain a "
"metadata format called EXIF which can include the date, time and sometimes "
"the GPS coordinates of the picture, the brand and serial number of the device "
"which took it as well as a thumbnail of the original image. Image processing "
"software tend to keep those data intact. Internet is full of cropped or "
"blurred images for which the EXIF thumbnail still contains the full original "
"picture."
"the GPS coordinates of the picture, the brand and serial number of the "
"device which took it as well as a thumbnail of the original image. Image "
"processing software tend to keep those data intact. Internet is full of "
"cropped or blurred images for which the EXIF thumbnail still contains the "
"full original picture."
msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
......@@ -335,8 +355,8 @@ msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"For more expert information see [Tor Project: The Second-Generation Onion "
"Router](https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/design-paper/tor-design.pdf), "
"part 3. Design goals and assumptions."
"Router](https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/design-paper/tor-design."
"pdf), part 3. Design goals and assumptions."
msgstr ""
#. type: Title =
......@@ -381,12 +401,12 @@ msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"Vidalia's \"New Identity\" button forces Tor to use new circuits but only for "
"new connections: existing connections might stay open. Plus, apart from the "
"Tor circuits, other kind of information can reveal your past activities, for "
"example the cookies stored by your browser. So this feature of Vidalia is not "
"a solution to really separate contextual identities. Shutdown and restart "
"Tails instead."
"Vidalia's \"New Identity\" button forces Tor to use new circuits but only "
"for new connections: existing connections might stay open. Plus, apart from "
"the Tor circuits, other kind of information can reveal your past activities, "
"for example the cookies stored by your browser. So this feature of Vidalia "
"is not a solution to really separate contextual identities. Shutdown and "
"restart Tails instead."
msgstr ""
#. type: Title =
......@@ -417,7 +437,8 @@ msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"Tails, as well as all the software it includes, are on continuous development "
"and might contain programming errors or security holes. [Stay tuned|download."
"html#index5h1] to Tails development. Do not rely on it for strong anonymity."
"Tails, as well as all the software it includes, are on continuous "
"development and might contain programming errors or security holes. [Stay "
"tuned|download.html#index5h1] to Tails development. Do not rely on it for "
"strong anonymity."
msgstr ""
......@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
msgid ""
msgstr ""
"Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n"
"POT-Creation-Date: 2011-11-20 16:40+0100\n"
"POT-Creation-Date: 2012-01-09 20:57+0100\n"
"PO-Revision-Date: YEAR-MO-DA HO:MI+ZONE\n"
"Last-Translator: FULL NAME <EMAIL@ADDRESS>\n"
"Language-Team: LANGUAGE <LL@li.org>\n"
......@@ -26,14 +26,14 @@ msgid ""
"Even though we're doing our best to offer you good tools to protect your "
"privacy while using a computer, **there is no magic or perfect solution to "
"such a complex problem**. Understanding well the limits of such tools is a "
"crucial step in, first, deciding whether Tails is the right tool for you, and "
"second, helping you making a good use of it."
"crucial step in, first, deciding whether Tails is the right tool for you, "
"and second, helping you making a good use of it."
msgstr ""
"A pesar de que hacemos nuestro mejor esfuerzo para ofrecer buenas "
"herramientas para proteger la privacidad mientras usas un computador, **no "
"hay una solución perfecta para un problema tan complejo**. Entender los "
"límites de esta herramienta es un paso crucial para luego decidir si "
"Tails es la herramienta correcta para ti y hacer un buen uso de ella."
"límites de esta herramienta es un paso crucial para luego decidir si Tails "
"es la herramienta correcta para ti y hacer un buen uso de ella."
#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
......@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ msgstr "**Tor es para ocultar tu ubicación, no para encriptar tu comunicación.
msgid ""
"Instead of taking a direct route from source to destination, communications "
"using the Tor network take a random pathway through several Tor relays that "
"cover your tracks. So no observer at any single point can tell where the data "
"came from or where it's going."
"cover your tracks. So no observer at any single point can tell where the "
"data came from or where it's going."
msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
......@@ -66,12 +66,12 @@ msgstr "[[!img htw2-tails.png link=no alt=\"Una conexión Tor generalmente pasa
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"The last relay on this circuit, called the exit node, is the one that "
"establishes the actual connection to the destination server. As Tor does not, "
"and by design cannot, encrypt the traffic between an exit node and the "
"establishes the actual connection to the destination server. As Tor does "
"not, and by design cannot, encrypt the traffic between an exit node and the "
"destination server, **any exit node is in a position to capture any traffic "
"passing through it**. See [Tor FAQ: Can exit nodes eavesdrop on "
"communications?](https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/"
"TorFAQ#CanexitnodeseavesdroponcommunicationsIsntthatbad)."
"communications?](https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/"
"TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#CanexitnodeseavesdroponcommunicationsIsntthatbad)."
msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
......@@ -80,7 +80,8 @@ msgid ""
"e-mail messages sent by foreign embassies and human rights groups around the "
"world by spying on the connections coming out of an exit node he was "
"running. See [Wired: Rogue Nodes Turn Tor Anonymizer Into Eavesdropper's "
"Paradise.](http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2007/09/embassy_hacks)."
"Paradise.](http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2007/09/"
"embassy_hacks)."
msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
......@@ -136,8 +137,8 @@ msgid ""
"A man-in-the-middle attack (MitM) is a form of active eavesdropping in which "
"the attacker makes independent connections with the victims and relays "
"messages between them, making them believe that they are talking directly to "
"each other over a private connection, when in fact the entire conversation is "
"controlled by the attacker."
"each other over a private connection, when in fact the entire conversation "
"is controlled by the attacker."
msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
......@@ -182,14 +183,31 @@ msgstr "[[!img ssl_warning.png link=no alt=\"Esta conexión no es confiable\"]]\
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"But on top of that the certificate authorities model of trust on Internet is "
"susceptible to various methods of compromise. For example, in March 15, 2011, "
"Comodo, one of the major SSL certificates company, reported that a user "
"account with an affiliate registration authority had been compromised. It was "
"then used to create a new user account that issued nine certificate signing "
"requests for seven domains: mail.google.com, login.live.com, www.google.com, "
"login.yahoo.com (three certificates), login.skype.com, addons.mozilla.org, "
"and global trustee. See [Comodo: The Recent RA Compromise](http://blogs."
"comodo.com/it-security/data-security/the-recent-ra-compromise/)."
"susceptible to various methods of compromise."
msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"For example, on March 15, 2011, Comodo, one of the major SSL certificates "
"company, reported that a user account with an affiliate registration "
"authority had been compromised. It was then used to create a new user "
"account that issued nine certificate signing requests for seven domains: "
"mail.google.com, login.live.com, www.google.com, login.yahoo.com (three "
"certificates), login.skype.com, addons.mozilla.org, and global trustee. See "
"[Comodo: The Recent RA Compromise](http://blogs.comodo.com/it-security/data-"
"security/the-recent-ra-compromise/)."
msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"Later in 2011, DigiNotar, a Dutch SSL certificate company, incorrectly "
"issued certificates to a malicious party or parties. Later on, it came to "
"light that they were apparently compromised months before or perhaps even in "
"May of 2009 if not earlier. Rogues certificates were issued for domains such "
"as google.com, mozilla.org, torproject.org, login.yahoo.com and many more. "
"See, [The Tor Project: The DigiNotar Debacle, and what you should do about "
"it](https://blog.torproject.org/blog/diginotar-debacle-and-what-you-should-"
"do-about-it)."
msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
......@@ -201,8 +219,8 @@ msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"On one hand, by providing anonymity, Tor makes it more difficult to perform a "
"man-in-the-middle attack targeted at **one specific person** with the "
"On one hand, by providing anonymity, Tor makes it more difficult to perform "
"a man-in-the-middle attack targeted at **one specific person** with the "
"blessing of a rogue SSL certificate. But on the other end, Tor makes it "
"easier for people or organizations running exit nodes to perform large scale "
"MitM attempts, or attacks targeted at **a specific server**, and especially "
......@@ -243,10 +261,10 @@ msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"Tor tries to protect against traffic analysis, where an attacker tries to "
"learn whom to investigate, but Tor can't protect against traffic confirmation "
"(also known as end-to-end correlation), where an attacker tries to confirm an "
"hypothesis by monitoring the right locations in the network and then doing "
"the math."
"learn whom to investigate, but Tor can't protect against traffic "
"confirmation (also known as end-to-end correlation), where an attacker tries "
"to confirm an hypothesis by monitoring the right locations in the network "
"and then doing the math."
msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
......@@ -264,10 +282,11 @@ msgstr "Tails no encripta tus documentos por defecto\n"
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"The documents that you might save on storage devices will not be encrypted by "
"default. But Tails provides you with tools to encrypt your documents, such as "
"GnuPG, or encrypt your storage device, such as LUKS. It is likely that the "
"files you may create will keep tracks that they were created using Tails."
"The documents that you might save on storage devices will not be encrypted "
"by default. But Tails provides you with tools to encrypt your documents, "
"such as GnuPG, or encrypt your storage device, such as LUKS. It is likely "
"that the files you may create will keep tracks that they were created using "
"Tails."
msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
......@@ -284,10 +303,11 @@ msgstr "Tails no borra los metadatos de tus documentos por ti\n"
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"Numerous files format store hidden data or metadata inside of the files. Text "
"processors or PDF files could store the name of the author, the date and time "
"of creation of the file, and sometimes even parts of the editing history of "
"the file… those hidden data depend on the file format and the software used."
"Numerous files format store hidden data or metadata inside of the files. "
"Text processors or PDF files could store the name of the author, the date "
"and time of creation of the file, and sometimes even parts of the editing "
"history of the file… those hidden data depend on the file format and the "
"software used."
msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
......@@ -295,11 +315,11 @@ msgid ""
"Images file formats, like TIFF of JPEG, probably take the prize in this "
"field. Those files, created by digital cameras or mobile phones, contain a "
"metadata format called EXIF which can include the date, time and sometimes "
"the GPS coordinates of the picture, the brand and serial number of the device "
"which took it as well as a thumbnail of the original image. Image processing "
"software tend to keep those data intact. Internet is full of cropped or "
"blurred images for which the EXIF thumbnail still contains the full original "
"picture."
"the GPS coordinates of the picture, the brand and serial number of the "
"device which took it as well as a thumbnail of the original image. Image "
"processing software tend to keep those data intact. Internet is full of "
"cropped or blurred images for which the EXIF thumbnail still contains the "
"full original picture."
msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
......@@ -334,8 +354,8 @@ msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"For more expert information see [Tor Project: The Second-Generation Onion "
"Router](https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/design-paper/tor-design.pdf), "
"part 3. Design goals and assumptions."
"Router](https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/design-paper/tor-design."
"pdf), part 3. Design goals and assumptions."
msgstr ""
#. type: Title =
......@@ -380,12 +400,12 @@ msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"Vidalia's \"New Identity\" button forces Tor to use new circuits but only for "
"new connections: existing connections might stay open. Plus, apart from the "
"Tor circuits, other kind of information can reveal your past activities, for "
"example the cookies stored by your browser. So this feature of Vidalia is not "
"a solution to really separate contextual identities. Shutdown and restart "
"Tails instead."
"Vidalia's \"New Identity\" button forces Tor to use new circuits but only "
"for new connections: existing connections might stay open. Plus, apart from "
"the Tor circuits, other kind of information can reveal your past activities, "
"for example the cookies stored by your browser. So this feature of Vidalia "
"is not a solution to really separate contextual identities. Shutdown and "
"restart Tails instead."
msgstr ""
#. type: Title =
......@@ -416,7 +436,8 @@ msgstr "Tails es un trabajo en progreso\n"
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"Tails, as well as all the software it includes, are on continuous development "
"and might contain programming errors or security holes. [Stay tuned|download."
"html#index5h1] to Tails development. Do not rely on it for strong anonymity."
"Tails, as well as all the software it includes, are on continuous "
"development and might contain programming errors or security holes. [Stay "
"tuned|download.html#index5h1] to Tails development. Do not rely on it for "
"strong anonymity."
msgstr ""
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