Commit f285993b authored by cri's avatar cri
Browse files

fixed 4 conflict of po meta

parents d4d2065c daca5d37
......@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ po_slave_languages:
#
# When updating this list, refer to the checklist in
# https://tails.boum.org/contribute/how/website/po_translatable_pages/
po_translatable_pages: '!security/audits and !security/audits/* and !news/report_2* and !news/version_0* and !news/test_0* and !news/test_*-rc? and !security/Numerous_security_holes_in_0* and (about or about/* or bugs or chat or contribute or contribute/how/donate or doc or doc/* or download or download.inline or getting_started or inc/stable_i386_release_notes or index or news or news/* or press or security or security/* or sidebar or support or support/* or todo or torrents or wishlist or misc or misc/* or install or install/* or upgrade or upgrade/*)'
po_translatable_pages: '!security/audits and !security/audits/* and !news/report_2* and !news/version_0* and !news/test_0* and !news/test_*-rc? and !security/Numerous_security_holes_in_0* and (about or about/* or bugs or chat or contribute or contribute/how/donate or doc or doc/* or download or download.inline or getting_started or inc/stable_i386_release_notes or index or home or news or news/* or press or security or security/* or sidebar or support or support/* or todo or torrents or wishlist or misc or misc/* or install or install/* or upgrade or upgrade/*)'
# internal linking behavior (default/current/negotiated)
po_link_to: current
......
......@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ po_slave_languages:
#
# When updating this list, refer to the checklist in
# https://tails.boum.org/contribute/how/website/po_translatable_pages/
po_translatable_pages: '!security/audits and !security/audits/* and !news/report_2* and !news/version_0* and !news/test_0* and !news/test_*-rc? and !security/Numerous_security_holes_in_0* and (about or about/* or bugs or chat or contribute or contribute/how/donate or doc or doc/* or download or download.inline or getting_started or inc/stable_i386_release_notes or index or news or news/* or press or security or security/* or sidebar or support or support/* or todo or torrents or wishlist or misc or misc/* or install or install/* or upgrade or upgrade/*)'
po_translatable_pages: '!security/audits and !security/audits/* and !news/report_2* and !news/version_0* and !news/test_0* and !news/test_*-rc? and !security/Numerous_security_holes_in_0* and (about or about/* or bugs or chat or contribute or contribute/how/donate or doc or doc/* or download or download.inline or getting_started or inc/stable_i386_release_notes or index or home or news or news/* or press or security or security/* or sidebar or support or support/* or todo or torrents or wishlist or misc or misc/* or install or install/* or upgrade or upgrade/*)'
# internal linking behavior (default/current/negotiated)
po_link_to: current
......
chutney @ 1a38ab2d
Subproject commit cd708d3003bc57cdc6ee06d18cfde75721a103bf
Subproject commit 1a38ab2da85d72e750b64d364d3605eae0ed8de6
......@@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ msgid ""
"email. It has a low traffic and it is the right place to stay up-to-date "
"with the releases and security announcements."
msgstr ""
"amnesia-news@boum.org est la liste où nous envoyons les [[actualités]] de "
"Tails par courrier électronique. Son trafic est faible et il s'agit de la "
"amnesia-news@boum.org est la liste où nous envoyons les [[actualités|news]] "
"de Tails par courrier électronique. Son trafic est faible et il s'agit de la "
"bonne liste pour rester à jour des nouvelles versions et des annonces de "
"sécurité."
......
[[!meta title="CRM for frontdesk"]]
[[!meta title="Request tracker (RT) for help desk"]]
We want a tool that allows frontdesk to:
========================================
We want a tool that allows our help desk to
===========================================
MUST
----
......
[[!meta title="Tails August 2016 report"]]
[[!toc levels=2]]
<div class="caution">
<strong>Deadline: 2016-09-05</strong>
</div>
<div class="note">
Deliverable identifiers and descriptions are not free-form: they must
be copy'n'pasted as-is from the proposal sent to the sponsor.
<pre>
## A.n. description of subsection
- A.n.m. description of deliverable: ticket numbers
status summary:
* what was done
* what is the outcome (how it makes Tails better)
* what was not done, and why
</pre>
</div>
[Last month's activity on Redmine](https://labs.riseup.net/code/projects/tails/issues?query_id=208)
can be helpful.
This reports covers the activity of Tails in August 2016.
Everything in this report is public.
# A. Replace Claws Mail with Icedove
- A.1.1. Secure the Icedove autoconfig wizard
XXX
- A.1.2. Make our improvements maintainable for future versions of Icedove
XXX
# B. Improve our quality assurance process
## B.3. Extend the coverage of our test suite
- B.3.11. Fix newly identified issues to make our test suite more robust and faster
XXX
- B.3.12. Reliably wait for post-Greeter hooks ([[!tails_ticket 5666]])
XXX
- B.3.14. Write tests for incremental upgrades ([[!tails_ticket 6309]])
XXX
# C. Scale our infrastructure
## C.1. Change in depth the infrastructure of our pool of mirrors:
- C.1.2. Write & audit the code that makes the redirection decision from our website
XXX
- C.1.6. Adjust download documentation to point to the mirror pool dispatcher's URL
XXX
- C.1.8. Clean up the remainers of the old mirror pool setup
XXX
# E. Release management
## E.1.12. Tails 2.5
XXX
......@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ MUST
- Allow backup of Persistent folder
- Allow backup on Local storage
- Ancrypt backups
- Encrypt backups
- Preserve permissions and ownership
- Understandable error messages
- Require administrator password when hitting a file not readable by amnesia
......@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ backup file format.
### Cons
- Duplicity creates tons of messy files on the file system.
- And requires users to do a full backup from time to time when using incremental backups
Loopback LUKS
-------------
......@@ -156,6 +157,14 @@ well as incremental backups.
* still requires a script of some sort to drive it
* probably requires a gui to make it simple to use
borgbackup
----------
Borg is the perfect backup back end. It supports increments, encryption,
data deduplication, local and remote backups, and mounting backups as
FUSE file systems. And it way faster than obnam which advertises similar
properties. But it doesn't have a graphical user interface.
Clone everything
----------------
......
This diff is collapsed.
......@@ -8,14 +8,17 @@ Availability and plans for the next weeks
- Volunteers to handle "[Hole in the
roof](https://labs.riseup.net/code/versions/198)" tickets this
month
- Volunteers to handle important tickets flagged for next release,
but without assignee
- Volunteers to handle important [tickets flagged for next release,
but without assignee](https://labs.riseup.net/code/projects/tails/issues?query_id=226)
- Availability and plans until the next meeting
- Important missing bits in the next [[monthly report|blueprint/monthly_report]].
Discussions
===========
* [[!tails_ticket 11061 desc="Make it easier to access WhisperBack from the Applications menu"]]
* [[!tails_ticket 10113 desc="Greeter option to enable microphone"]]
* [[!tails_ticket 8183 desc="Investigate shipping 64-bit (x86_64) instead of 32-bit userspace"]]
* [[!tails_ticket 11717 desc="Consider dropping launchers from the Desktop"]]
* [[!tails_ticket 11615 desc="What about keybase.io?"]]
* [[!tails_ticket 11663 desc="Clarifying the scope of hardware support"]]
* [[!tails_ticket 11775 desc="Decide when to close down tails-support"]]
* [[!tails_ticket 11767 desc="Gender neutral translations in German: discuss MITM"]]
* [[!tails_ticket 7687 desc="Consider removing ekeyd"]]
......@@ -23,9 +23,21 @@ Code
XXX: List important code work that is not covered already by the Release
section (for example, the changes being worked on for the next version).
- We updated our roadmap, listing our [[priorities for the next
years|blueprint/roadmap]].
- Use a dedicated homepage for *Tor Browser* in Tails to be able to
customize what we are showing when people start Tails ([[!tails_ticket 11725]]).
Documentation and website
=========================
- We documented how to [[install *Tails Installer* in Ubuntu
16.04|install/debian/usb#ubuntu]] ([[!tails_ticket 11570]]).
Unfortunately, this has to be done on the command line since *Tails
Installer* is not listed in the new *Ubuntu Software* yet. But we are
working on fixing this ([[!tails_ticket 11569]]).
User experience
===============
......@@ -81,8 +93,6 @@ XXX: Add the output of `contribute/l10n_tricks/language_statistics.sh`
Metrics
=======
* Tails has been started more than BOOTS/MONTH times this month. This makes BOOTS/DAY boots a day on average.
* SIGS downloads of the OpenPGP signature of Tails ISO from our website.
* WHISPERBACK bug reports were received through WhisperBack.
XXX: Ask tails@boum.org for these numbers.
* Tails has been started more than 589774 times this month. This makes 19025 boots a day on average.
* 10921 downloads of the OpenPGP signature of Tails ISO from our website.
* 111 bug reports were received through WhisperBack.
# /dev/random and /dev/urandom radomness seeding in Tails
/dev/random and /dev/urandom are especial Linux devices that provide access from user land
/dev/random and /dev/urandom are special Linux devices that provide access from user land
to the Linux kernel Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG). This generator is used for almost
every security protocol, like TLS/SSL key generation, choosing TCP sequence and file system and email
encryption [1]. Such PRNG requires a a "good" source of randomness on initialization,
......@@ -14,13 +14,111 @@ Because of the Tails nature of being amnesic, and run from a live device,
the seed file is public and the same each boot for a given Tails release,
this may make the output of /dev/urandom predictable.
The urandom initscript makes it clear that the assumption for this file is that its content
Althought this problem has been documented since a long time (see [7] and [8]),
there's not so much LiveCD OSes out there that tackle it. Whonix has a [wiki
page](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Dev/Entropy) with some notes.
The sysVinit random initscript makes it clear that the assumption for this file is that its content
is "unique to this machine and not known to attackers"... which is not the case when we
ship that file in our ISO images. If that file doesn't exist, the initscript seeds urandom
with the output of date +%s.%N only. The same initscript says that "re-using a seed compromises
security". Only /dev/urandom is at risk here. /dev/random is not.
security". Only /dev/urandom is at risk here. /dev/random is a bit less as it blocks
if system entropy gets too low, though it means sometimes an application may not work
(i.e freeze a long time) because of that.
Except that initscript is masked by urandom.service, so what matters now is how
/lib/systemd/systemd-random-seed load behaves in the absence of any /var/lib/systemd/random-seed
(Tails 2.0.1 ships no such file).
Read [2],[3],[4],[5] and [6] for more information.
## Current situation
See the related [[design document|contribute/design/random]] (available after
the Tails 2.6 release only).
Tails has stopped shipping /var/lib/urandom/random-seed, since it is a fixed known value
for every Tails installation which means its entropy contribution is zero.
Without this random seed, systemd-random-seed load won't write anything to
/dev/urandom (so we rely purely on the kernel and current system entropy to get
/dev/urandom). This new behavior can't be much worse, and the fact it's the new
debootstrap and systemd default behavior tends to be reassuring.
Tails also ships Haveged since a while, and rngd since 2.6. Note that in
Stretch, Haveged will be started very early at boot time (after the apparmor
profiles loading), before any userland application needs randomness. Still there
are concerns about Haveged's reliability to provide cryptographically secure
randomness.
Ekeyd is also included in Tails.
So the situation may not be that bad, but given the Live nature of Tails,
and the fact that good cryptography is a must, we may want to add additional
measures to ensure any Tails system has enough entropy.
## Use cases
We have several use cases, which may require different solutions, depending on
how the Tails OS is installed.
### DVD
This may be the most difficult, since all that the user is running is the plain
ISO we provide. In there, there's no seed at all, and no way for the users to
add one.
On the other hand, that's not the installation method we want to support the
most, and probably not the most used when people want to secure other
communication types than HTTPS (e.g persistence is very usefull for OpenPGP key
storage and usage, chat account configuration, ...).
So we may eventually just document somewhere to users that they MUST NOT use
this type of installation if they want to rely on good cryptograpy for their
communications and key generation, or that they should wait after having
interacting a long (but hard to define) time with the system so that it had time
to collect entropy, and rely on Haveged + rngd only.
We could also add some kind of notification to users when entropy gets too low,
or just saying them that the way they use Tails is not compatible with strong
cryptography.
### Intermediary USB
This type of installation is supposed to be used when people are installing
Tails from another OS (except Debian and Ubuntu, where they can use the Tails
installer). In most case, this means having a bit by bit copy of the Tails ISO
on the USB stick, except for Windows where we ask to use the [Universal USB
Installer](http://www.pendrivelinux.com/universal-usb-installer-easy-as-1-2-3/)
Read [2],[3],[4],[5],[6],[7] and [8] for more information.
In this case the situation is pretty much the same than with the DVD one. No
seed, and adding one is very difficult if not impossible (except with the
Windows installation where we may ask upstream to implement that in the
Universal USB Installer, but well...).
That's also not really the way we push to users to use Tails, so as with DVD
there's maybe no point to fix the situation here, and the same workaround could
maybe apply. XXX: discuss that?
### Final USB
That's supposed to be the standard way to use Tails.
Note that in this case, there are two situations: using this installation with
persistence enabled, and without.
It is worth noting too that the first time this Tails installation is booted,
most of the time the first step is to configure persistence, which means
creating an encrypted partition. At this step though, there is at the moment
probably very little entropy, so this may weaken the LUKS volume encryption.
### Virtual Machines
That's a way to use Tails, and one of the worste cases: it is of public
knowledge that entropy in VMs is very poor. It's not really clear how the
entropy gathering daemons we have would help, but there are mechanisms now in
libvirt to pass randomness from the host using the Virtio RNG feature (even if
it may not be enough by itself).
## Proposed solutions
......@@ -31,41 +129,100 @@ generate cryptographic keys, like for example for Pidgin-OTR, using SSH or gener
We hope to improve this situation for users who enable the persistence storage option using some
randomness from the previous session to help bootstrap with some "well" generated randomness.
However this option is only useful for users with persistence enabled, and does not solve the
problem for the first time Tails is booted.
Storing it in the persistent partition will be implemented using a default
hidden persistence setting. But it does not solve the problem for the first time
Tails is booted, which is likely when the encrypted persistence partition is
created.
### Use a stronger entropy collector library [[!tails_ticket 5650]]
We could try haveged as well as other entropy collection daemons. It would be nice to
have study (read: a survey of packages, etc) of all the useful entropy gathering daemons
that might be of use on a Tails system.
As already stated, Tails run Haveged, and rngd (since 2.6 for the later).
### Use the Tails installer to create a better seed
We may want to add other sources though, given there are concerns about Haveged,
and rngd starts only when a hardware RNG is detected, which is not so often the
case.
Tails installer can be used on Debian and Ubuntu, and in the future on
Windows and OSX, we could use their PRNG to generate a presumably better
seed file on every new Tails installation. Of course this should be a post installation
mechanism, after verifying the ISO/disk image hash/signature.
XXX: It would be nice to have a study (read: a survey of packages, etc) of all the
useful entropy gathering daemons that might be of use on a Tails system.
This would at least provide a better escenario than the one with the same known
and constant seed file, which provides entropy zero.
An evaluation of some of them [has been done
already](https://volumelabs.net/best-random-data-software/)
This solution is partial since it only works for Tails Installer+USB stick, and doesn't
provide persistence by itself, but might be a complementary solution for [[!tails_ticket 7675]].
Possible candidates:
* [entropy gathering daemon](http://egd.sourceforge.net/): not packaged into Debian.
* [twuewand](http://www.finnie.org/software/twuewand/): used by Finnix LiveCD, packaged into Ubuntu only.
* [timer entropy daemon](https://www.vanheusden.com/te/): not packaged into Debian
* randomsound: probably a bad idea in the Tails context as we're discussing a
Greeter option to deactivate the microphone.
## Current workaround
### Block booting till enough entropy has been gathered
Tails has stopped shipping /var/lib/urandom/random-seed, since it is a fixed known value
for every Tails installation which means its entropy contribution is zero.
One way to ensure Tails is booting with enough entropy would be to block during
the boot if the system is lacking of it.
On Tails 2.x we ship /var/lib/urandom/random-seed, that would be used by the urandom initscript...
except that initscript is masked by urandom.service, so what matters now is how
/lib/systemd/systemd-random-seed load behaves in the absence of any /var/lib/systemd/random-seed
(Tails 2.0.1 ships no such file).
But this brings questions about how to interact correctly with the users,
as blocking without notifications would be terrible UX. Also Tails boot time is
a bit long already, and this may grow it quite a bit more again.
XXX: So before going on, we need a bit more data about the state of the entropy when
Tails boot, specially now that we have several entropy collector daemons. It may
very well be that this case do not happen anymore. And if it is, we need to know
on average how much time that blocking would last. [Sycamoreone] [[!tails_ticket
11758]]
### Use the Tails installer to create a better seed
Tails installer can be used on Debian and Ubuntu, and maybe in the future on
Windows and OSX, we could use their PRNG to generate a presumably better
seed file on every new Tails installation. Of course this should be a post installation
mechanism, after verifying the ISO/disk image hash/signature.
Systemd-random-seed load won't write anything to /dev/urandom (so we rely purely on the kernel and
current system entropy to get /dev/urandom). This new behavior can't be much worse, and the fact it's
the new debootstrap and systemd default behavior tends to reassure me somewhat.
This mechanism would store the seed in the FAT filesystem of the system
partition. That would workaround this first boot problem not handled by the
persistence option, but has the drawback that if we want to refresh it on every
shutdown, we'd have to remount RW this partition, growing the time it takes to
shutdown Tails. This may be workarounded by refreshing this seed file during the
session, when Tails has been booted since X minutes (and entropy seems good
enough).
Using this in addition to the persistent seed mentionned above may thus be the
way to go.
This solution is partial since it only works for Tails Installer+USB stick, and
there's actually quite a lot of entropy (we sadly can't collect) about the
future of the Tails installer.
One drawback: this would break the ability to verify this system partition with
a simple shasum operation.
Keep in mind that this solution works only when using the Tails installer,
which is mostly when people are using Linux (or Tails) to install Tails.
However, there are standard Python libraries that help to generate Cryptographically
Strong Pseudo Random Numbers (CSPRNG) [9]. They are mainly based in the os.urandom,
defined in [10], "...This function returns random bytes from an OS-specific randomness source.
The returned data should be unpredictable enough for cryptographic applications,
though its exact quality depends on the OS implementation.
On a UNIX-like system this will query /dev/urandom, and on Windows it will use
CryptGenRandom(). If a randomness source is not found, NotImplementedError will be raised.".
This means, if we use this library the generated code would be portable among several
operation systems (Here we assume Mac OS is also included, but that might be tested).
Besides the code would be simple enough, here an example:
import os
import sys
import random
# Random bytes
bytes = os.urandom(32)
csprng = random.SystemRandom()
# Random (probably large) integer
random_int = csprng.randint(0, sys.maxint)
As a side point, we could try to integrate the created code with
the persistence setup (althought it is made in Perl), and also we might
locate it in the Tails Python library.
## Related tickets
......@@ -82,3 +239,5 @@ This is about [[!tails_ticket 7642]], [[!tails_ticket 7675]],
* [6] <https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/qubes-devel/5wI8ygbaohk>
* [7] <https://www.av8n.com/computer/htm/secure-random.htm>
* [8] <http://www.av8n.com/computer/htm/fixup-live-cd.htm>
* [9] <https://www.python.org/dev/peps/pep-0506/>
* [10]<https://docs.python.org/2/library/os.html#os.urandom>
[[!meta title="Roadmap for the next years"]]
- **Easier adoption**
- **Revamp Tails Greeter**: make it easier to configure Tails when starting ([[!tails_ticket 5464]])
- **Simplify the interface of Tails Installer**: prevent confusion and
mistakes by getting rid of the first screen ([[!tails_ticket 8859]])
- **Rethink the installation and upgrade process**: take a step back and reflect
on the future of Tails Installer, the installation on Windows and
Mac, and automatic upgrades ([[!tails_ticket 11679]])
- **Graphical installation method for Mac OS**: what would it take
to document tools other than Tails Installer to do a graphical
installation from Mac OS? ([[!tails_ticket 11682]])
- **Explain better what Tails is** and what makes it so awesome ([[!tails_ticket 9814]])
- **Security hardening**
- **Reproducible build of the ISO image**: protect users and
developers from a malicious build of our ISO image ([[!tails_ticket 5630]])
- **Persistent Tor state**: have persistent entry guards for each network connection ([[!tails_ticket 5462]])
- **HTTPS mirrors**: serve our downloads over HTTPS only ([[!tails_ticket 9796]])
- **Persistent seed for random number generator**: have better entropy and stronger crypto ([[!tails_ticket 7675]])
- **Stronger HTTPS**: have our website in the HSTS preload lists of major browsers ([[!tails_ticket 8191]])
- **Community**
- **Web platform for translators**: make it easier to translate our website ([[!tails_ticket 10034]])
- **Social contract**: guiding principles that reflects the commitment to our ideals ([[!tails_ticket 11669]])
- **Personas**: study and describe our user base to take better design decisions ([[!tails_ticket 11162]])
- **Better user support**
- **Request tracker**: platform to handle better support requests ([[!tails_ticket 9960]])
- **Improvements to WhisperBack**: make it easier and faster to answer support requests ([[!tails_ticket 9799]] [[!tails_ticket 9800]])
- **Sustainability**
- **Tails based on Debian Stretch** ([Tails 3.0](https://labs.riseup.net/code/versions/278))
- **Migrate to Python 3**: adapt our custom programs and rewrite scripts ([[!tails_ticket 5958]] [[!tails_ticket 11198]])
- **Better server infrastructure**: to handle our growing needs on continuous integration and have a backup server ([[!tails_ticket 11680]] [[!tails_ticket 6185]])
- **New applications and features**
- **Graphical interface for the Additional Packages persistent feature**: allow users to customize which applications are available in Tails ([[!tails_ticket 9050]] [[!tails_ticket 9059]])
- **Backups**: provide a graphical tool to backup the persistent volume ([[!tails_ticket 5301]])
- **Screen locker**: allow users to lock their session with a password ([[!tails_ticket 5684]])
- **Full self-upgrades**: upgrade a Tails from itself endlessly for ease and security ([[!tails_ticket 7499]])
- **Tails Server**: run onion services from Tails (collaboration tools, web servers, messaging servers, etc.) ([[!tails_ticket 5688]])
- **Tails Verifier**: allow verifying whether a Tails installation has been corrupted ([[!tails_ticket 7496]])
- **VoIP application** ([[!tails_ticket 11551]])
- **Investigate possible replacements for Pidgin** ([[!tails_ticket 11686]])
- **TrueCrypt support in GNOME Disks and udisks**: graphical utilities to mount TrueCrypt volumes ([[!tails_ticket 11684]] [[!tails_ticket 6337]])
[[!meta title="Roadmap for 2016-2017"]]
- **Hardening**
- **Persistent Tor state**: have persistent entry guards for each network connection ([[!tails_ticket 5462 desc="#5462"]])
- **Protect against external bus exploitation**: Thunderbolt, BlueTooth, FireWire, PCMCIA, etc. ([[!tails_ticket 5451 desc="#5451"]])
- **Stronger HTTPS**: HSTS preload lists of major browsers ([[!tails_ticket 8191 desc="#8191"]])
- **Persistent seed for random number generator**: have stronger entropy and crypto ([[!tails_ticket 7675 desc="#7675"]])
- **Robust time syncing**: currently quite fragile ([[!tails_ticket 5774 desc="#5774"]])
- **International audience**
- **Persistent Tor configuration**: for proxies and bridges to circumvent censorship ([[!tails_ticket 5461 desc="#5461"]])
- **Translation web platform**: make it easier to translate our website ([[!tails_ticket 10034 desc="#10034"]])
- **Easier adoption**
- **Revamp Tails Greeter**: make it easier to find your way and choose the correct options ([[!tails_ticket 5464 desc="#5464"]])
- **Multiplatform Tails Installer**: port to Windows and Mac OS X ([[!tails_ticket 7544 desc="#7544"]])
- **Improve Tails Installer**: make it smarter and simpler ([[!tails_ticket 9798 desc="9798"]])
- **Explain better what Tails is** and what makes it so awesome ([[!tails_ticket 9814 desc="#9814"]])
- **Revamp the website**: for both users and contributors, computer and mobile ([[!tails_ticket 10031 desc="#10031"]])
- **Better user support**
- **Request tracker**: platform to handle better users requests ([[!tails_ticket 9960 desc="#9960"]])
- **Small improvements to WhisperBack**: make it easier and faster to answer requests ([[!tails_ticket 9799 desc="#9799"]] [[!tails_ticket 9800 desc="#9800"]])
- **Polished and reliable platform**
- **Tor and network progress bar**: provide better feedback throughout the process of getting connected to Tor ([[!tails_ticket 7437 desc="#7437"]])
- **Improve additional packages persistence feature**: better allow for specific needs to be met ([[!tails_ticket 9050 desc="#9050"]] [[!tails_ticket 9059 desc="#9059"]])
- **Localized clock**: allow the user to configure the clock to display the local time ([[!tails_ticket 6284 desc="#6284"]])
- **Backup system for persistence** ([[!tails_ticket 5301 desc="#5301"]])
- **Screen locker** ([[!tails_ticket 5684 desc="#5684"]])
- **Full self-upgrades**: upgrade a Tails from itself endlessly for ease and security ([[!tails_ticket 7499 desc="#7499"]])
- **Sustainability**
- **Reproducible build of the ISO image**: protect from maliciously built ISO images ([[!tails_ticket 5630 desc="#5630"]])
- **Automated Debian package build infrastructure**: less maintenance and step towards reproducible builds ([[!tails_ticket 6220 desc="#6220"]])
- **Fundraising**
- **Have more reliable and steady sources of incomes**
- **Depend less on grants from governments**
......@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
msgid ""
msgstr ""
"Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n"
"POT-Creation-Date: 2016-05-31 15:54+0300\n"
"POT-Creation-Date: 2016-09-10 14:06+0300\n"
"PO-Revision-Date: 2014-04-18 23:25+0100\n"
"Last-Translator: FULL NAME <EMAIL@ADDRESS>\n"
"Language-Team: LANGUAGE <LL@li.org>\n"
......@@ -553,6 +553,6 @@ msgstr "Mit uns reden\n"
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"To talk to other Tails contributors, subscribe to our [[tails-dev@boum.org|"
"about/contact#tails-dev]] mailing list."
"To talk to other Tails contributors, subscribe to [[the relevant mailing "
"lists|about/contact]]."
msgstr ""
......@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ msgid ""
msgstr ""
"Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n"
"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: tails-l10n@boum.org\n"
"POT-Creation-Date: 2016-05-31 15:54+0300\n"
"POT-Creation-Date: 2016-09-10 14:06+0300\n"
"PO-Revision-Date: 2015-10-15 15:23+0000\n"
"Last-Translator: sprint5 <translation5@451f.org>\n"
"Language-Team: Persian <http://weblate.451f.org:8889/projects/tails/"
......@@ -538,8 +538,8 @@ msgstr "با ما تماس بگیرید\n"
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"To talk to other Tails contributors, subscribe to our [[tails-dev@boum.org|"
"about/contact#tails-dev]] mailing list."
"To talk to other Tails contributors, subscribe to [[the relevant mailing "
"lists|about/contact]]."
msgstr ""
#~ msgid "[[contribute/Low-hanging_fruit_sessions]]"
......
......@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
msgid ""
msgstr ""
"Project-Id-Version: Tails\n"
"POT-Creation-Date: 2016-05-31 15:54+0300\n"
"POT-Creation-Date: 2016-09-10 14:06+0300\n"
"PO-Revision-Date: 2016-06-05 10:04-0000\n"
"Last-Translator: \n"
"Language-Team: Tails translators <tails@boum.org>\n"
......@@ -489,6 +489,6 @@ msgstr "Nous contacter\n"
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"To talk to other Tails contributors, subscribe to our [[tails-dev@boum.org|"
"about/contact#tails-dev]] mailing list."
"To talk to other Tails contributors, subscribe to [[the relevant mailing "
"lists|about/contact]]."
msgstr ""
......@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
msgid ""
msgstr ""
"Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n"
"POT-Creation-Date: 2016-05-31 15:54+0300\n"
"POT-Creation-Date: 2016-09-10 14:06+0300\n"