Commit ee097349 authored by Tails developers's avatar Tails developers
Browse files

Adapt user documentation to the move to Tor Browser (Closes: 7962)

parent e0f77c6b
......@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@ Networking
- the [Vidalia](https://www.torproject.org/projects/vidalia) graphical frontend
* [NetworkManager](http://projects.gnome.org/NetworkManager/) for easy
network configuration
* [Firefox](http://getfirefox.com) preconfigured with:
- TorBrowser patches
* [Tor Browser](https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html.en), a web
browser based on [Mozilla Firefox](http://getfirefox.com) and configured to protect your anonymity with:
- [Torbutton](https://www.torproject.org/torbutton) for anonymity
and protection against evil JavaScript
- all cookies are treated as session cookies by default;
......
......@@ -7,8 +7,8 @@ whether a particular user is using Tails or not.
[[As explained on our warning page|warning#fingerprint]], when using
Tails it is possible to know that you are using Tor. But Tails tries to
**make it as difficult as possible to distinguish Tails users from other
Tor users**, especially Tor Browser Bundle (TBB) users. If it is
possible to determine whether your are a Tails users or a TBB user, this
Tor users**, especially users of Tor Browser outside of Tails. If it is
possible to determine whether your are a Tor Browser user inside or outside of Tails, this
provides more information about you and in consequence reduces your
anonymity.
......@@ -23,18 +23,17 @@ about your browser. That information can include its name and version,
window size, list of available extensions, timezone, available fonts,
etc.
To make it difficult to distinguish Tails users from TBB users, **the
Tor browser tries to provide the same information as the TBB** in
To make it difficult to distinguish Tails users, **the
Tor Browser in Tails tries to provide the same information as the Tor Browser on other operating systems** in
order to have similar fingerprints.
See the [[fingerprint section of known issues
page|support/known_issues#fingerprint]] for a list of known differences
between the fingerprints of the Tor browser and the TBB.
between the fingerprints of the Tor Browser inside and outside of Tails.
Apart from that, **some of the extensions included in Tor browser are
different** than the ones included in the TBB. More sophisticated
attacks can use those differences to distinguish Tails user from TBB
users.
Apart from that, **some of the Tor Browser extensions included in Tails are
specific to Tails**. More sophisticated
attacks can use those differences to distinguish Tails users.
For example, Tails includes <span class="application">Adblock
Plus</span> which removes advertisements. If an attacker can determine
......@@ -53,10 +52,10 @@ For your ISP or local network administrator
our documentation about [[doc/first_steps/startup_options/bridge_mode]].
- A Tails system is **almost exclusively generating Tor activity** on
the network. Usually TBB users also have network activity outside of
the network. Usually users of Tor Browser on other operating systems also have network activity outside of
Tor, either from another web browser or other applications. So the
proportion of Tor activity could be used to determine whether a user
is using Tails or the TBB. If you are sharing your Internet
proportion of Tor activity could be used to determine whether a user of Tor Browser
is using Tails or not. If you are sharing your Internet
connection with other users that are not using Tails it is probably
harder for your ISP to determine whether a single user is generating
only Tor traffic and so maybe using Tails.
......@@ -67,11 +66,11 @@ For your ISP or local network administrator
user always uses the same few relays as first hops. As Tails does not
store any Tor information between separate working sessions, it does
not store the entry guards information either. This behaviour could
be used to distinguish Tails users from TBB users across several
be used to distinguish Tails users across several
working sessions.
- When starting, Tails synchronizes the system clock to make sure it
is accurate. While doing this, if the time is set too much in the
past or in the future, Tor is shut down and started again. This
behavior could be used to distinguish Tails from TBB users,
behavior could be used to distinguish Tails users,
especially this happens every time Tails starts.
......@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ HTTPS Everywhere
[[!img https-everywhere.jpg link=no alt="HTTPS Everywhere logo"]]
[HTTPS Everywhere](https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere) is a Firefox extension
shipped in Tails and produced as a collaboration between [The Tor
included in Tor Browser and produced as a collaboration between [The Tor
Project](https://torproject.org/) and the [Electronic Frontier
Foundation](https://eff.org/). It encrypts your communications with a number of
major websites. Many sites on the web offer some limited support for encryption
......@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ JavaScript]], [[!wikipedia Adobe_Flash]], [[!wikipedia HTTP_cookie
desc="cookies"]] and other services which have been shown to be able to defeat
the anonymity provided by the Tor network.
In Tails all such features are handled from inside the browser by an extension
In Tor Browser all such features are handled from inside the browser by an extension
called [Torbutton](https://www.torproject.org/torbutton/) which does all sorts
of things to prevent the above type of attacks. But that comes at a price: since
this will disable some functionalities and some sites might not work as
......@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ Protection against dangerous JavaScript
Having all JavaScript disabled by default would disable a lot of harmless and
possibly useful JavaScript and render unusable many websites.
That's why **JavaScript is enabled by default** in Tails.
That's why **JavaScript is enabled by default** in Tor Browser.
But we rely on Torbutton to **disable all potentially dangerous JavaScript**.
......@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ NoScript to have even more control over JavaScript
[[!img noscript.png link=no alt="NoScript logo"]]
To allow more control over JavaScript, for example to disable JavaScript
completely, Tails includes the <span class="application">NoScript</span>
completely, Tor Browser includes the <span class="application">NoScript</span>
extension.
By default, <span class="application">NoScript</span> is disabled and some
......
......@@ -29,8 +29,8 @@ anonymous</strong>. Use it only to log in to captive portals.</p>
Security recommendations:
* Do not run this browser at the same time as the normal, anonymous
web browser. This makes it easy to not mistake one browser for the
* Do not run this browser at the same time as the anonymous
[[Tor Browser|Tor_Browser]]. This makes it easy to not mistake one browser for the
other, which could have catastrophic consequences.
* When using [[doc/first_steps/startup_options/windows_camouflage]]
......
......@@ -164,10 +164,10 @@ compromise between usability and security in this case.
<a id="add-ons"></a>
Can I install other add-ons in the browser?
Can I install other add-ons in Tor Browser?
-------------------------------------------
Installing add-ons in the browser might break the security built in Tails.
Installing add-ons in Tor Browser might break the security built in Tails.
Add-ons can do many things within the browser, and even if all the networking goes
through Tor, some add-ons might interact badly with the rest of the
......
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