Commit e9e5badc authored by sajolida's avatar sajolida
Browse files

Use automatic reference of ids in TOC

parent cdbba0a1
......@@ -8,19 +8,13 @@ make a good use of it.
[[!toc levels=2]]
<a id="compromised_hardware"></a>
Tails does not protect against compromised hardware
===================================================
<h1 id="compromised_hardware">Tails does not protect against compromised hardware</h1>
If the computer has been compromised by someone having physical access
to it and who installed untrusted pieces of hardware (like a
keylogger), then it might be unsafe to use Tails.
<a id="untrusted_system"></a>
Tails can be compromised if installed or plugged in untrusted systems
=====================================================================
<h1 id="untrusted_system">Tails can be compromised if installed or plugged in untrusted systems</h1>
When starting your computer on Tails, it cannot be compromised by a virus in your usual operating
system, but:
......@@ -35,10 +29,7 @@ system, but:
See the [[corresponding FAQ|support/faq#compromised_system]].
<a id="bios"></a>
Tails does not protect against BIOS or firmware attacks
=======================================================
<h1 id="bios">Tails does not protect against BIOS or firmware attacks</h1>
It is also impossible for Tails to protect against attacks made through
the BIOS or other firmware embedded in the computer. These are
......@@ -48,10 +39,7 @@ such attacks.
See for example, this [attack on BIOS by
LegbaCore](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sNYsfUNegEA).
<a id="exit_node"></a>
Tor exit nodes can eavesdrop on communications
==============================================
<h1 id="exit_node">Tor exit nodes can eavesdrop on communications</h1>
**Tor is about hiding your location, not about encrypting your communication.**
......@@ -81,10 +69,7 @@ Paradise](http://archive.wired.com/politics/security/news/2007/09/embassy_hacks)
browsing, sending email or chatting, as presented on our [[about
page|/about#cryptography]].
<a id="fingerprint"></a>
Tails makes it clear that you are using Tor and probably Tails
==============================================================
<h1 id="fingerprint">Tails makes it clear that you are using Tor and probably Tails</h1>
**Your Internet Service Provider (ISP) or your local network administrator**
can see that you're connecting to a Tor relay, and not a normal web server for
......@@ -104,10 +89,7 @@ users look the same so it's not possible to identify who is who amongst them.
See also [[Can I hide the fact that I am using Tails?|fingerprint]]
<a id="man-in-the-middle"></a>
Man-in-the-middle attacks
=========================
<h1 id="man-in-the-middle">Man-in-the-middle attacks</h1>
A man-in-the-middle attack (MitM) is a form of active eavesdropping in which the
attacker makes independent connections with the victims and relays messages
......@@ -175,8 +157,7 @@ href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/detecting-certificate-authority-compromis
Project: Detecting Certificate Authority compromises and web browser
collusion</a>.</p>
Confirmation attacks
====================
<h1 id="confirmation">Confirmation attacks</h1>
The Tor design doesn't try to protect against an attacker who can see or measure
both traffic going into the Tor network and also traffic coming out of the Tor
......@@ -197,8 +178,7 @@ math.
href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/one-cell-enough">Tor Project: "One cell
is enough to break Tor's anonymity"</a>.</p>
Tails doesn't encrypt your documents by default
===============================================
<h1 id="encryption">Tails doesn't encrypt your documents by default</h1>
The documents that you might save on storage devices are not encrypted by
default, except in the [[Persistent Storage|doc/first_steps/persistence]], which is entirely encrypted.
......@@ -210,8 +190,7 @@ It is also likely that the files you might create will contain evidence that the
**If you need to access the local hard-disks** of the computer you are using, be
conscious that you might then leave traces of your activities with Tails on it.
Tails doesn't clear the metadata of your documents for you and doesn't encrypt the Subject: and other headers of your encrypted email messages
===========================================================================================
<h1 id="metadata">Tails doesn't clear the metadata of your documents for you and doesn't encrypt the Subject: and other headers of your encrypted email messages</h1>
Numerous files formats store hidden data or metadata inside of the files. Word
processing or PDF files could store the name of the author, the date and time of
......@@ -236,8 +215,7 @@ which the included EXIF thumbnail still shows the original picture.
Tails' design goal to help you do that. For example, Tails already comes with
the [Metadata anonymisation toolkit](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2).
Tor doesn't protect you from a global adversary
===============================================
<h1 id="global-adversary">Tor doesn't protect you from a global adversary</h1>
A global passive adversary would be a person or an entity able to monitor at the
same time the traffic between all the computers in a network. By studying, for
......@@ -253,10 +231,7 @@ For more expert information see the Tor design paper, "[Tor Project: The Second-
Router](https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/design-paper/tor-design.pdf)",
specifically, "Part 3. Design goals and assumptions."
<a id="identities"></a>
Tails doesn't magically separate your different contextual identities
=====================================================================
<h1 id="identities">Tails doesn't magically separate your different contextual identities</h1>
It is usually not advisable to use the same Tails session to perform two tasks
or endorse two contextual identities that you really want to keep separate
......@@ -285,8 +260,7 @@ is limited to the browser.
There is no <span class="guilabel">New Identity</span> button for Tails as a
whole.
Tails doesn't make your crappy passwords stronger
=================================================
<h1 id="passwords">Tails doesn't make your crappy passwords stronger</h1>
Tor allows you to be anonymous online; Tails allows you to leave no trace on the
computer you're using. But again, **neither or both are magic spells for computer
......@@ -297,8 +271,7 @@ without Tails in the same way. To know if your passwords are weak and learn good
practices to create better password, you can read [[!wikipedia
Weak_password#Examples_of_weak_passwords desc="Wikipedia: Weak Passwords"]].
Tails is a work in progress
===========================
<h1 id="wip">Tails is a work in progress</h1>
Tails, as well as all the software it includes, are continuously being developed
and may contain programming errors or security holes.
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