Use automatic reference of ids in TOC

wiki/src/doc/about/warning.mdwn

@@ -8,19 +8,13 @@ make a good use of it.
 
 [[!toc levels=2]]
 
-<a id="compromised_hardware"></a>
-
-Tails does not protect against compromised hardware
-===================================================
+<h1 id="compromised_hardware">Tails does not protect against compromised hardware</h1>
 
 If the computer has been compromised by someone having physical access
 to it and who installed untrusted pieces of hardware (like a
 keylogger), then it might be unsafe to use Tails.
 
-<a id="untrusted_system"></a>
-
-Tails can be compromised if installed or plugged in untrusted systems
-=====================================================================
+<h1 id="untrusted_system">Tails can be compromised if installed or plugged in untrusted systems</h1>
 
 When starting your computer on Tails, it cannot be compromised by a virus in your usual operating
 system, but:
@@ -35,10 +29,7 @@ system, but:
 
 See the [[corresponding FAQ|support/faq#compromised_system]].
 
-<a id="bios"></a>
-
-Tails does not protect against BIOS or firmware attacks
-=======================================================
+<h1 id="bios">Tails does not protect against BIOS or firmware attacks</h1>
 
 It is also impossible for Tails to protect against attacks made through
 the BIOS or other firmware embedded in the computer. These are
@@ -48,10 +39,7 @@ such attacks.
 See for example, this [attack on BIOS by
 LegbaCore](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sNYsfUNegEA).
 
-<a id="exit_node"></a>
-
-Tor exit nodes can eavesdrop on communications
-==============================================
+<h1 id="exit_node">Tor exit nodes can eavesdrop on communications</h1>
 
 **Tor is about hiding your location, not about encrypting your communication.**
 
@@ -81,10 +69,7 @@ Paradise](http://archive.wired.com/politics/security/news/2007/09/embassy_hacks)
 browsing, sending email or chatting, as presented on our [[about
 page|/about#cryptography]].
 
-<a id="fingerprint"></a>
-
-Tails makes it clear that you are using Tor and probably Tails
-==============================================================
+<h1 id="fingerprint">Tails makes it clear that you are using Tor and probably Tails</h1>
 
 **Your Internet Service Provider (ISP) or your local network administrator**
 can see that you're connecting to a Tor relay, and not a normal web server for
@@ -104,10 +89,7 @@ users look the same so it's not possible to identify who is who amongst them.
 
 See also [[Can I hide the fact that I am using Tails?|fingerprint]]
 
-<a id="man-in-the-middle"></a>
-
-Man-in-the-middle attacks
-=========================
+<h1 id="man-in-the-middle">Man-in-the-middle attacks</h1>
 
 A man-in-the-middle attack (MitM) is a form of active eavesdropping in which the
 attacker makes independent connections with the victims and relays messages
@@ -175,8 +157,7 @@ href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/detecting-certificate-authority-compromis
 Project: Detecting Certificate Authority compromises and web browser
 collusion</a>.</p>
 
-Confirmation attacks
-====================
+<h1 id="confirmation">Confirmation attacks</h1>
 
 The Tor design doesn't try to protect against an attacker who can see or measure
 both traffic going into the Tor network and also traffic coming out of the Tor
@@ -197,8 +178,7 @@ math.
 href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/one-cell-enough">Tor Project: "One cell
 is enough to break Tor's anonymity"</a>.</p>
 
-Tails doesn't encrypt your documents by default
-===============================================
+<h1 id="encryption">Tails doesn't encrypt your documents by default</h1>
 
 The documents that you might save on storage devices are not encrypted by
 default, except in the [[Persistent Storage|doc/first_steps/persistence]], which is entirely encrypted.
@@ -210,8 +190,7 @@ It is also likely that the files you might create will contain evidence that the
 **If you need to access the local hard-disks** of the computer you are using, be
 conscious that you might then leave traces of your activities with Tails on it.
 
-Tails doesn't clear the metadata of your documents for you and doesn't encrypt the Subject: and other headers of your encrypted email messages
-===========================================================================================
+<h1 id="metadata">Tails doesn't clear the metadata of your documents for you and doesn't encrypt the Subject: and other headers of your encrypted email messages</h1>
 
 Numerous files formats store hidden data or metadata inside of the files. Word
 processing or PDF files could store the name of the author, the date and time of
@@ -236,8 +215,7 @@ which the included EXIF thumbnail still shows the original picture.
 Tails' design goal to help you do that. For example, Tails already comes with
 the [Metadata anonymisation toolkit](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2).
 
-Tor doesn't protect you from a global adversary
-===============================================
+<h1 id="global-adversary">Tor doesn't protect you from a global adversary</h1>
 
 A global passive adversary would be a person or an entity able to monitor at the
 same time the traffic between all the computers in a network. By studying, for
@@ -253,10 +231,7 @@ For more expert information see the Tor design paper, "[Tor Project: The Second-
 Router](https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/design-paper/tor-design.pdf)",
 specifically, "Part 3. Design goals and assumptions."
 
-<a id="identities"></a>
-
-Tails doesn't magically separate your different contextual identities
-=====================================================================
+<h1 id="identities">Tails doesn't magically separate your different contextual identities</h1>
 
 It is usually not advisable to use the same Tails session to perform two tasks
 or endorse two contextual identities that you really want to keep separate
@@ -285,8 +260,7 @@ is limited to the browser.
 There is no <span class="guilabel">New Identity</span> button for Tails as a
 whole.
 
-Tails doesn't make your crappy passwords stronger
-=================================================
+<h1 id="passwords">Tails doesn't make your crappy passwords stronger</h1>
 
 Tor allows you to be anonymous online; Tails allows you to leave no trace on the
 computer you're using. But again, **neither or both are magic spells for computer
@@ -297,8 +271,7 @@ without Tails in the same way. To know if your passwords are weak and learn good
 practices to create better password, you can read [[!wikipedia
 Weak_password#Examples_of_weak_passwords desc="Wikipedia: Weak Passwords"]].
 
-Tails is a work in progress
-===========================
+<h1 id="wip">Tails is a work in progress</h1>
 
 Tails, as well as all the software it includes, are continuously being developed
 and may contain programming errors or security holes.