Commit d5742da9 authored by samueldibella's avatar samueldibella
Browse files

Moved up browsing explanation, split final sentence

parent 583b4101
......@@ -247,13 +247,13 @@ Adversaries could relate different tasks done in a Tails session by:
Tails and the Tor Browser naturally connect to different websites via different [[circuits in the Tor network|doc/anonymous_internet/tor_status]].
But if you connect to the same website several times in one session,
like logging into two accounts on the same social media website, Tails and the Tor Browser
use the same circuit. This website could link both activities by observing
that they are coming from the same Tor circuit.
use the same circuit. This website could then link those activities by noting
that they come from the same Tor circuit.
To ensure you use new Tor circuits for Internet traffic:
* If you only use the Tor Browser, you can click its [[**New Identity** button|anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser]] to create a new circuit.
* If you use multiple applications to connect to the Internet, you can restart Tails.
* If you only use the Tor Browser to connect to the Internet, you can click its [[**New Identity** button|anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser]] to create a new circuit.
* If you use multiple applications, you can restart Tails.
For more about how Tor does or does not preserve anonymity, see the [Tor Project's documentation](https://support.torproject.org/#staying-anonymous).
......@@ -264,11 +264,10 @@ Adversaries could relate different tasks done in a Tails session by:
That way the Persistent Storage of, say, your activist email in *Thunderbird* can be kept separate
from your use of Tails for work.
We also recommend this step if you worry about
someone gaining physical access to your computer or USB sticks, or if you
have to use Tails on an insecure or public computer because [[Tails can't
protect against compromised
hardware|/doc/about/warning#compromised_hardware]].
We also recommend this step if you worry about someone gaining physical access
to your computer or USB sticks. This is particularly a concern if you have to
use Tails on an insecure or public computer, because
[[Tails can't protect against compromised hardware|/doc/about/warning#compromised_hardware]].
<h1 id="passwords">Tails doesn't make your crappy passwords stronger</h1>
......
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