Commit c4bdd6c1 authored by Tails developers's avatar Tails developers
Browse files

Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into stable

parents ebf1a454 434137dd
[[!meta title="Blueprints"]]
[[!map pages="blueprint/*"]]
[[!map pages="page(blueprint/*)" show=title]]
......@@ -25,16 +25,43 @@ Given an ISO build takes around 30-45 minutes on lizard (worst case),
given two builders lizard will be able to build something like 64-96
ISOs a day.
Developers should be able to trigger automatic builds for a branch whose build
was dropped (eg. last commit too old) by pushing a dumb commit on a
timestamp file in that branch.
Developers can easily add a branch back to the automated builds
whenever it has been removed from the list (for example after
a release) by merging its base branch into it.
Proposal1:
* branches which are not merged into master, devel, stable and testing
* but had new commits since the previous release
## How to build it
A topic branch may be lagging behind the base branch it's based upon.
What we're interested in is generally *not* whether a (possibly
outdated) topic branch builds fine, but whether it would build fine
**once merged into its base branch**:
* that's critical from a reviewer's perspective: what they have to
evaluate is the result of the merge, not the state of a topic branch
forked N weeks ago from its base branch, that possibly has diverged
since then;
* that's important from a developer's perspective: this is how they
will notice if incompatible changes have landed into the base branch
since last time they worked on their topic branch.
Hence, when building topic branch F, we need to build from branch F
*once merged into* branch B. However, this merge must only be done
*locally*, at least because Jenkins doesn't have push access to our
Git repo.
Here, *locally* means: in Jenkins own temporary Git checkout.
The exact direction of the merge (B->F vs. F->B) should not matter
given how Git merge works, if we got it clearly. We'll see.
This locally-merge-before-building process requires [[!tails_ticket
8654]] to be implemented, otherwise we can't easily merge branches
*locally* without affecting the state of our production APT repo.
## When to build it
......@@ -55,13 +82,8 @@ Proposal 1:
Email will be the main interface.
For base branches:
* When failing after a git push, notify the last commit author.
* When failing after the daily trigger, notify the RM.
For topic branches, notify the author of the last commit.
* For base branches, notify the RM.
* For topic branches, notify the author of the last commit.
# Scenarios
......@@ -78,16 +100,29 @@ In the following scenario:
When I'm asked to review branch F into branch B
Then I need to know if branch F builds fine
once locally merged into branch B (fresh results!)
And I should be notified of the results
So, if there is no such fresh build available
Then I manually trigger a build of branch F
And if the build succeeded
I might want to download the resulting ISO
I might want to get the pkg list
I want the Redmine ticket to be notified (optional)
Otherwise if it fails the developer who proposed the merge should be notified
The resulting ISO must be made available to me
The pkg list must be made available to me
The Redmine ticket should be notified
Otherwise if it fails the developer who proposed the merge must be notified
And the developer *needs* to see the build logs
And the ticket should be reassigned to the branch submitter
And QA check should be set to "Dev needed"
Bonus:
* Notify the manual build requester of the build results. Depends on
using Jenkins internal authentication system, and may be complicated
if it doesn't attach email address info to each user (apparently the
Email-ext plugin just builds the email address by concatenating
login, `@` and a fixed domain name -- this could be worked around
with email aliases hosted somewhere on our infrastructure).
* Make it easy for the reviewer to know whether the last build of
branch F is current. Or, better (?), trigger rebuilds of all topic
branches upon modifications (possibly == rebuild) on their
base branch.
## Scenario 2 : developer
......@@ -99,11 +134,11 @@ In the following scenario:
possibly weeks after my last commit (by e.g Debian changes,
changes in branch B, ...)
And if the build succeeded
I might want to download the resulting ISO
I might want to get the pkg list
I want the Redmine ticket to be notified (optional)
The resulting ISO must be made available to me
The pkg list must be made available to me
The Redmine ticket should be notified
Otherwise if it fails I *need* to see the build logs
And the developer who proposed the merge should be notified
And the developer who proposed the merge must be notified
And the ticket should be reassigned to the branch submitter
And QA check should be set to "Dev needed"
......@@ -112,8 +147,8 @@ In the following scenario:
As the current RM
When working the full dev release cycle
Then I need to know when a branch FTBFS
And when this happens I need to see the build logs.
Then I need to know when a base branch fails to build
And when this happens the build logs must be made available to me.
# Future ideas
......
......@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ workflow:
- Tails Installer in Debian
- [[Browser extensions|extension]] for automatic verification of the ISO
- [[Web assistant|web_assistant]] to guide the user throughout this process
- [[Web assistant|assistant]] to guide the user throughout this process
[[Diagram of the detailed workflow as of December 2015|2015.fodg]] (work in progress)
......@@ -64,14 +64,14 @@ Notes:
- **Debian keyring** are command line instructions for verifying the
Tails signing key against the Debian keyring.
- **Extension from Debian** takes for granted that the ISO verification
extension will be available in Debian ([[!tails_ticket 8822]]. That
extension will be available in Debian ([[!tails_ticket 8822]]). That
might not be the case and then people would fallback on "Extension
from browser".
- **GNOME Disks** now has a "Restore Disk Image" feature which should do the
trick and is widely available, see [[!tails_ticket 8664]].
- **UUI** has been our canonical installer for years, but we should also test
**Rufus**, see [[!tails_ticket 7034]].
- **DiskUtils** should be tested on Mac, see [[!tails_ticket 8802]].
- **UUI** has been our canonical installer for years.
- **DiskUtils** should be tested on Mac, unfortunately it doesn't work
for us ([[!tails_ticket 8802]]).
Bonus for 2015
--------------
......
This diff is collapsed.
......@@ -35,10 +35,6 @@ Open problems:
example to feed it into Tails Installer?
- If we ask the user for its OS type, version, desired medium, does
this have privacy implications? Do we want to do statistics on that?
- What do we advice to do when the verification fails?
- Try to download again using archive.torproject.org? Go somewhere
else? What if torproject.org is censored?
- What do we do with the bad ISO? Rename? Delete? Save? Analyse?
- Investigate how we could monitor the usage of the assistant: most
common path, failures, people leaving, etc. But this can have
privacy issues.
......@@ -48,4 +44,3 @@ Open problems:
- Clone from a friend
- Use a different computer than yours
- Use Linux if available around you
- Have a path all in command line?
......@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ This has to be considered as part of a bigger plan to:
- Further automate ISO verification. See the blueprint on [[ISO
verification|verification]].
- Guide the user through the whole process. See the blueprint on the
[[web assistant]].
[[web assistant|assistant]].
The extension will be used as well by people doing full upgrades until
we automate the download and verification steps of a full upgrade in
......@@ -92,9 +92,10 @@ ISO verification
- `tails-i386-x.x.x-CORRUPTED.iso` if the verification fails.
- The extension displays the result to the user.
- According to the result, the web assistant proposes to either:
- Continue with the installation (if VERIFIED).
- Download the ISO again (if INCOMPLETE).
- Proposes troubleshooting strategies (if CORRUPTED).
- if VERIFIED: continue with the installation.
- if INCOMPLETE: explain calmly that the download has been
interrupted and propose to download the ISO again.
- if CORRUPTED: proposes troubleshooting strategies.
Open questions
--------------
......@@ -107,6 +108,10 @@ Open questions
- If the extension is installed, are we sure to be able to detect it
automatically? For example in Tor Browser of if JavaScript is
disabled?
- It would be nice to have the extension able to handle interrupted or
paused downloads. If so, how do we integrate this in the workflow?
Shall we propose to download what's missing from the ISO if the
verification fails?
<a id="verification"></a>
......@@ -116,7 +121,7 @@ ISO verification mechanism
We are considering here an attacker who can:
- (A) Provide a malicious ISO image to the user for example by
operating a rogue Tails mirror or BitTorrent tracker.
operating a rogue Tails mirror or BitTorrent file.
We are not considering an attacker who can:
......
[[!meta title="Tails Installer"]]
[[!toc levels=2]]
Vision
======
......@@ -26,6 +28,8 @@ to Tails Upgrader. See the [[blueprint on Tails Upgrader|upgrade]].
Roadmap
=======
<a id="2015"></a>
2015
----
......@@ -36,30 +40,51 @@ requires rethinking the scenarios in which Tails Installer is used
Those are the improvements that we propose for 2015:
- Remove the splash screen:
- Outside of Tails
- In Tails, add a "Clone" button to the main interface
- Implement "Install from ISO".
- Autodetect if the destination key has Tails already.
- Then display "Install" and "Upgrade" buttons accordingly.
- Make it possible to do "Install from ISO" and "Upgrade from ISO" from
the command line. See the [[Debian Hacker|bootstrapping#tools]] bootstrapping path.
- Adapt the splash screen to work outside of Tails (no "Clone"
option).
- Rework the wording of the main interface.
- Add visual and textual context to main interface.
- Point to website to download ISO if outside of Tails.
- Add second button "Upgrade" below or side-by-side with "Install"
button.
- Add a splash about creating persistence after rebooting.
This will have to be coordinated with the Ubuntu release calendar.
Ubuntu 15.10 is planned to be freezed in August 2015.
<a id="bonus_for_2015"></a>
Bonus for 2015
--------------
The following improvements would be nice addition to the roadmap for
2015, if possible:
2015, if possible.
First of all:
1. Autodetect if the destination key has Tails already, without making
this visible to the user yet, but that's one left thing to do for the
next steps.
2. Simplify a bit the splash screen thanks to the autodetection code:
merge "Clone and Install" and "Clone and Upgrade" into one single
"Clone" button. And then, depending on whether the destination
device has already Tails installed or not, dynamically change the
label of main action button to "Install" or "Upgrade", or whatever
you prefer. (Note: this breaks the "re-installing Tails from
scratch" use case, but IIRC we already have documented how to
uninstall Tails, so that's no big deal).
3. If the destination device has already Tails installer, add second
"Upgrade" button below or side-by-side with the "Install" button.
This allows again to either reinstall Tails from scratch or to
upgrade.
4. Remove the splash screen in Tails, and add a "Clone" button to the
main interface.
And then:
- Point to website to download ISO if outside of Tails.
- Make it possible to do "Upgrade from ISO" from
the command line. See the [[Debian Hacker|bootstrapping#tools]] bootstrapping path.
- Make it possible to do "Install from ISO" from
the command line. See the [[Debian Hacker|bootstrapping#tools]] bootstrapping path.
- Store version of Tails on destination key after install and upgrade.
- This would allow to display version in "Target Device".
- Have Tails Installer available on Mac as it seems hard to find a
......
......@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ Vision
======
We have always pushed our users to verify our ISO images. But so far
this has been a complicated tasks, as it mainly relies on OpenPGP. But
this has been a complicated task, as it mainly relies on OpenPGP. But
we cannot ask newcomers to know OpenPGP before they get an ISO image
they can trust. So we want to automated this verification as much as
they can trust. So we want to automate this verification as much as
possible, while leaving the room for expert users to do more extensive
verification if they want to.
......@@ -42,8 +42,8 @@ The advantages of going this way instead of pushing more verification
logic into the browser extension are that:
- More people will be able to work on such code.
- We will no rely on browsers for serious cryptography.
- We will have less restrictions than inside browser extensions.
- We will not rely on browsers for serious cryptography.
- We will have less implementation restrictions than inside browser extensions.
The cons:
......@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ The cons:
verification for them.
- How would people verify Tails Installer on Windows and OS X? Maybe
the browser extension could do that by then.
- The browser extension will loose some of its relevance. It will
- The browser extension will lose some of its relevance. It will
still be useful until we get there, and maybe to verify Tails
Installer.
......@@ -75,9 +75,10 @@ The idea behind Seahorse Nautilus was to allow an OpenPGP verification even for
people with no or little understanding of OpenPGP. The advantages are:
- seahorse-nautilus runs from outside of the browser.
- seahorse-nautilus can be authenticated through APT even in Debian Jessie.
- If you get the right OpenPGP key, you rely on the developers and not on the
boum.org website.
- seahorse-nautilus can be authenticated through APT even in Debian
Wheezy (via backports).
- If you get the right OpenPGP key, you rely on Tails developers and not on the
the webserver used for downloading the ISO.
But documenting Seahorse Nautilus has we have been doing until now is only
stronger than the Firefox extension if TOFU is done well. And we believe that
......
......@@ -44,16 +44,21 @@ Image creation and maintenance
This is about [[!tails_ticket 7533]]. That's Docker's equivalent of
Vagrant's basebox.
The Debian images' creation process has been [described by Joey
The semi-official Debian images' creation process has been [described by Joey
Hess](http://joeyh.name/blog/entry/docker_run_debian/). They are built
with <https://github.com/tianon/docker-brew-debian.git>, which itself
uses
[`mkimage.sh`](https://github.com/docker/docker/blob/master/contrib/mkimage.sh).
There are `rootfs.tar.xz` files in the former repository.
The [[!debwiki Cloud/CreateDockerImage]] Debian wiki page documents
how to use only stuff shipped in Debian to create a Debian image with
a single command. That's presumably what we should do.
But there are other solutions around there that feel saner:
* Jonathan Dowland has [documented](http://jmtd.net/log/debian_docker/)
and [published](https://github.com/jmtd/debian-docker/) the scripts he
uses to build his own Debian images from scratch, which feels saner.
* The [[!debwiki Cloud/CreateDockerImage]] Debian wiki page documents
how to use only stuff shipped in Debian to create a Debian image with
a single command.
See also <https://docs.docker.com/articles/baseimages/>.
......
......@@ -35,3 +35,5 @@ IRC" one.
Or we could host the whole set of our own Git repositories ourselves,
so that we can use KGB or irker.
Note that GitLab also supports GitHub-style webhooks.
......@@ -5,13 +5,17 @@
Availability and plans for the next weeks
=========================================
- Volunteers to handle "[Hole in the roof](https://labs.riseup.net/code/versions/198)" tickets this month
- Volunteers to handle "[Hole in the
roof](https://labs.riseup.net/code/versions/198)" tickets this
month
- Volunteers to handle important tickets flagged for next release,
but without assignee
- Availability and plans for monthly low-hanging fruits meeting
Discussions
===========
- [[!tails_ticket 8586 desc="Create a directory of organizations doing Tails training"]]
- [[!tails_ticket 8832 desc="Consider removing signature from Torrent"]]
- [[!tails_ticket 8931 desc="Decide if we want to do the verification in the website or in the add-ons menus"]]
- [[!tails_ticket 8872 desc="Decide which kind of verification would the ISO verification extension do"]]
- [[!tails_ticket 7400 desc="Don't start Vidalia in Windows 8 camouflage?"]]
- [[!tails_ticket 8873 desc="Decide which kind of verification would the ISO verification extension do"]]
- Important tickets with milestone, but without assignee, see [the mailing-list](https://mailman.boum.org/pipermail/tails-dev/2015-February/008239.html)
[[!meta title="Tails report for January and February, 2015"]]
Welcome to the new Tails report!
This edition is more complete than last time. We have some good news to share and you can also see that we did some good work. If you have suggestions about what to include next time, please write to <tails-project@boum.org> about it :)
[[!toc ]]
Releases
========
* [[Tails 1.2.3 was released on January 15, 2015.|news/version_1.2.3]] (minor release)
* Tails 1.3 was released on February 24, 2015. (major release)
* The next release (1.3.1) is [[planned for the 7th of April|contribute/calendar]].
Metrics
=======
In January:
* Tails has been started more than 356,292 times in January. This makes 11,493 boots a day on average.
* 27,617 downloads of the OpenPGP signature of Tails ISO from our website.
* 108 bug reports were received through WhisperBack.
In February:
* Tails has been started more than FIXME times in February. This makes FIXME boots a day on average.
* FIXME downloads of the OpenPGP signature of Tails ISO from our website.
* FIXME bug reports were received through WhisperBack.
* [[Tails 1.3 was released on February 24, 2015.|news/version_1.3]] (major release)
* The next release (1.3.1) is [[planned for March 31|contribute/calendar]].
Code
====
The complete list of improvements is in the release announce. Some major points are:
The complete list of improvements is in the release announcements. Some major points are:
* Distribute a hybrid ISO image again: no need for anyone to manually run isohybrid anymore!
* Tails now ships the electrum bitcoin client.
* Distribute a hybrid ISO image again: no need for anyone to manually run <span class="command">isohybrid</span> anymore!
* Tails now ships the <span class="application">Electrum</span> Bitcoin client.
* Support obfs4 Tor bridges.
* Touchpad: enable tap-to-click, 2-finger scrolling, and disable while typing.
* remove polipo
You can also contribute, see our call for help: [[Help have a Windows camouflage in Tails Jessie!|news/windows_camouflage_jessie]]
Documentation and website
=========================
......@@ -41,78 +27,112 @@ Documentation and website
- We completely rewrote the documentation on [[virtualization|doc/advanced_topics/virtualization]]. It now makes it clearer what is virtualization, what are the [[security implications|doc/advanced_topics/virtualization#security]] and provides detailed instructions on how to setup Tails in [[VirtualBox|doc/advanced_topics/virtualization/virtualbox]], [[virt-manager|doc/advanced_topics/virtualization/virt-manager]], and [[GNOME Boxes|doc/advanced_topics/virtualization/boxes]], either straight from ISO, from a [[physical USB stick|doc/advanced_topics/virtualization/virt-manager#usb]], or from a [[virtual USB stick|doc/advanced_topics/virtualization/virt-manager#virtual_usb]].
- We explained the risks of [[accessing internal
hard|doc/encryption_and_privacy/your_data_wont_be_saved_unless_explicitly_asked]]
disks from Tails.
hard disks|doc/encryption_and_privacy/your_data_wont_be_saved_unless_explicitly_asked#access_hdd]] from Tails.
Translation and internationalization
====================================
- ... and plenty of small improvements everywhere :)
All website PO files
--------------------
User experience
===============
- de: 12% (712) strings translated, 0% strings fuzzy, 10% words translated
- fr: 47% (2,679) strings translated, 2% strings fuzzy, 47% words translated
- pt: 34% (1,975) strings translated, 2% strings fuzzy, 34% words translated
* We discussed a solution for a [[screen
locker|blueprint/screen_locker]] that could be reused by other live
distributions.
[[Core PO files|contribute/l10n_tricks/core_po_files.txt]]
=====================
* We [reviewed](https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/8235#note-11) the
latest mockups of the [[new Tails Greeter|blueprint/greeter_revamp_UI]]
with usability experts.
- de: 28% (368) strings translated, 1% strings fuzzy, 31% words translated
- fr: 93% (1,212) strings translated, 2% strings fuzzy, 97% words translated
- pt: 94% (1,225) strings translated, 3% strings fuzzy, 104% words translated
* We analyzed in depth the process for new users to [[get started with
Tails|blueprint/bootstrapping]] and made plans to adjust the relevant
tools ([[Tails Installer|blueprint/bootstrapping/installer]],
[[browser extension|blueprint/bootstrapping/extension]], [[Tails
Upgrader|blueprint/bootstrapping/upgrade]], and [[web
assistant|blueprint/bootstrapping/assistant]]).
Infrastructure
==============
FIXME Our test suite covers 109 scenarios, 22 more that in July 2014.
* Lots of automatic tests! FIXME list major categories
* New certificate in 1.2.3, new signing key in 1.3
On-going discussions
====================
* Our test suite covers 172 scenarios, 85 (!) more than in July 2014. That's a huge improvement because each release can be automatically tested to avoid regressions instead of having to manually perform the same tests each time. There is still some way to go, but someday releasing will be fast, safe, and easy :)
There is lots of work going on to have a [[new Greeter design|blueprint/greeter_revamp_UI/]].
* Tails ships a new certificate in 1.2.3, and a new signing key in 1.3.
[Discussion on the mailing-list](https://mailman.boum.org/pipermail/tails-ux/2015-February/000256.html)
* We rewrote the history of our main Git repository to make it four times smaller.
This should make the new contributors' experience much nicer.
[[!tails_ticket 8235]]
* We upgraded the hardware of our main server so that it can handle the short and mid-term plans we have for it: [[!tails_ticket 6196 desc="automatically building ISO images from all active branches"]], and then [[!tails_ticket 5288 desc="running our automated test suite on these ISO images"]].
Funding
=======
Laura Poitras and Edward Snowden won [[Ridenhour's film award for Citizenfour|http://www.nationinstitute.org/blog/prizes/4376/%22citizenfour%22_will_receive_the_ridenhour_documentary_film_prize/]] and offers the $10K prize to Tails - thanks, Laura and Edward! (and congratulations for the Oscar)
* Laura Poitras and Edward Snowden won [[Ridenhour's film award for Citizenfour|http://www.nationinstitute.org/blog/prizes/4376/%22citizenfour%22_will_receive_the_ridenhour_documentary_film_prize/]] and offered the $10K prize to Tails - thanks, Laura and Edward! (and congratulations for the Oscar)
FIXME
* The Freedom Of The Press Foundation continues [[their crowdfunding campaign|https://freedom.press//bundle/encryption-tools-journalists]] for Tails (and other great projects!). Of course, there are [[many other ways to donate|contribute/how/donate]] if you want to help :)
Outreach
========
Tails now has a [[code of conduct|contribute/working_together/code_of_conduct]]!
* We passed a call for [[help to have a Windows camouflage in Tails Jessie|news/windows_camouflage_jessie]]!
Some Tails developers attended [FOSDEM](https://fosdem.org/2015/) in Brussels, saw some interesting talks and I hear the belgian beer was good.
* Tails now has a [[code of conduct|contribute/working_together/code_of_conduct]]!
FIXME: Roma
* Two of us attended [FOSDEM](https://fosdem.org/2015/) in Brussels, saw some interesting talks and I hear the Belgian beer was good.
* One of us gave a talk at the Sapienza University of Rome, Italy ([slides](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/how/promote/material/slides/Roma-Uni_Sapienza-20150127/Tails.shtml)). Thanks a lot to the local organizers!
On-going discussions
====================
* [[We did not reach an agreement yet|https://mailman.boum.org/pipermail/tails-dev/2015-January/007821.html]] about [[!tails_ticket 8665 desc="removing Adblock Plus"]] (to have a fingerprint closer to the Tor Browser Bundle's one) or keeping it (because it's more comfortable for users).
* People try to come up with the best ideas for [[Tor Monitor|http://git.tails.boum.org/alan/tor-monitor]], a [[!tails_ticket 6841 desc="replacement for Vidalia"]] in Tails Jessie. This is [[discussed on tails-dev|https://mailman.boum.org/pipermail/tails-dev/2015-February/thread.html#8038]].
* What kind of [verification mechanism](https://mailman.boum.org/pipermail/tails-dev/2015-February/008059.html) shall we do in the future [[ISO verification extension|blueprint/bootstrapping/extension]].
Press & Testimonials
====================
Four major french-speaking medias (Le Monde, La Libre Belgique, Le Soir de Bruxelles and RTBF - radio-télévision belge) have launched [Source Sûre](https://sourcesure.eu/), a whistleblowing platform, in french, that uses Tails.
* Four major French-speaking medias (Le Monde, La Libre Belgique, Le Soir de Bruxelles and RTBF - radio-télévision belge) have launched [Source Sûre](https://sourcesure.eu/), a whistleblowing platform, in French, that uses Tails.
UX
==
* Many people seemed excited to hear about the Bitcoin wallet in Tails and wrote about it. Welcome, Bitcoin community :)
- We discussed a solution for a [[screen
locker|blueprint/screen_locker]] that could be reused by other live
distributions.
Translation and internationalization
====================================
- We [reviewed](https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/8235#note-11) the
latest mockups of the [[new Tails Greeter|blueprint/greeter_revamp_UI]]
with usability experts.
* Some new translators joined the German translation team within the last months. It's now the biggest translation team and they're seriously working to have all the core pages of the website translated. Nearly halfway there, keep up :)
- We analyzed in depth the process for new users to [[get started with
Tails|blueprint/bootstrapping]] and made plans to adjust the relevant
tools ([[Tails Installer|blueprint/bootstrapping/installer]],
[[browser extension|blueprint/bootstrapping/extension]], [[Tails
Upgrader|blueprint/bootstrapping/upgrade]], and [[web
assistant|blueprint/web_assistant]]).
* The French translation team manages to keep the core pages up-to-date, but the rest of the web site could use more attention.
* The Portuguese translation team has not been very active lately, so the Portuguese translations slowly becomes obsolete.
* The Spanish and Italian translation teams are still at the organizing stages so their translations have not started yet.
* For all those languages (and other ones!), [[new translators are really welcome|contribute/how/translate/]]!
All website PO files
--------------------
- de: 16% (979) strings translated, 0% strings fuzzy
- fr: 50% (3,004) strings translated, 1% strings fuzzy
- pt: 32% (1,947) strings translated, 2% strings fuzzy
[[Core PO files|contribute/l10n_tricks/core_po_files.txt]]
---------------------
- de: 44% (571) strings translated, 0% strings fuzzy
- fr: 96% (1,223) strings translated, 1% strings fuzzy
- pt: 92% (1,173) strings translated, 4% strings fuzzy
Metrics
=======
In January:
* Tails has been started more than 356,292 times in January. This makes 11,493 boots a day on average.
* 27,617 downloads of the OpenPGP signature of Tails ISO from our website.
* 108 bug reports were received through WhisperBack.
In February:
* Tails has been started more than 344,664 times in February. This makes 12,309 boots a day on average.
* 25,530 downloads of the OpenPGP signature of Tails ISO from our website.
* 89 bug reports were received through WhisperBack.
[[!meta title="Tails report for March, 2015"]]
This report is a bit special: since we release every 6 weeks, there is no release this month. The next one is [[planned for the 31th of March|contribute/calendar]]. Therefore there are no code news, the work being done will be reported when it's released :)
However, like any Free Software project, Tails is not only about the code, so here are the news about the other parts of the project. And for starters, a bit a recursivity: in March, we... published the two previous reports ;)
[[!toc ]]
Documentation and website
=========================
* We explained why users [[shouldn't update Tails using `apt-get` or <span class="application">Synaptic</span>|support/faq#index8h2]].
*
User Experience
===============