Commit b6d965c1 authored by sajolida's avatar sajolida
Browse files

Write deprecation notice

parent 13c22ffe
......@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ implementations](
We cannot use the native [SubtleCrypto.digest()
because it [cannot use
because it [cannot read files as
streams]( and would require
loading the entire image in memory before computing its checksum.
[[!meta date="Tue, 01 Dec 2020 12:34:56 +0000"]]
[[!pagetemplate template="news.tmpl"]]
[[!meta title="Deprecation of the Tails Verification extension"]]
[[!tag announce]]
Today, we are retiring the *Tails Verification* browser extension that
used to be advertised on our download page. We are replacing it with
similar JavaScript code that now runs directly on the page.
This new verification procedure is:
- Simpler and faster for first-time users
- Compatible with more web browsers, for example with Edge and Safari
- As secure as the *Tails Verification* extension
From the logs on our website, it seems like only a minority of downloads are
currently verified. We believe that this simplified verification procedure will
increase a lot the number of verified downloads and the security of our users.
Users of the *Tails Verification* extension can safely remove it from their
browser. They will be reminded to do so on the download page.
We will remove the *Tails Verification* extension from the Firefox and Chrome
stores in a few days.
The other 2 verification techniques are still available:
- If you download Tails using BitTorrent, your BitTorrent client
automatically verifies the checksum of the Tails image when the
download finishes.
- If you know OpenPGP, you can verify your Tails image using an OpenPGP
Special thanks to [Mike Meixler]( who donated his
time to helped us with the verification JavaScript!
In the future, this simplification will allow us to further simplify the
download page and installation instructions. We also want to research how to
make the verification faster. If you know WebAssembly, see if you can help us
[speed up the checksum computation](
See also our [[design document on the security and threat model of the
download verification|contribute/design/download_verification]].
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