msgid "Tor exit nodes can eavesdrop on communications\n"
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@@ -128,6 +133,7 @@ msgid ""
msgstr "**Es por esto que usar Tails no te hace ver como un usuario de internet cualquiera.** El anonimato entregado por Tor y Tails funciona haciendo ver igual a cualquiera de sus usuarios, de modo que sea imposible identificar quién es quién dentro de ellos.\n"
#. type: Plain text
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msgid "<a id=\"man-in-the-middle\"></a>\n"
msgstr ""
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@@ -369,6 +375,11 @@ msgid ""
"pdf), part 3. Design goals and assumptions."
msgstr ""
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msgid "<a id=\"identities\"></a>\n"
msgstr ""
#. type: Title =
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msgid "Tails doesn't magically separate your different contextual identities\n"
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@@ -387,7 +398,7 @@ msgid ""
"First, because Tor tends to reuse the same circuits, for example amongst a "
"same browsing session. Since the exit node of a circuit knows both the "
"destination server (and possibly the content of the communication if not "
"encrypted) and the address of the previous relay he received the "
"encrypted) and the address of the previous relay it received the "
"communication from, it makes it easier to correlate the several browsing "
"requests as part of a same circuit and possibly made by a same user. If you "
"are facing a global adversary as described above, it might then also be in "