Commit a19757ed authored by sajolida's avatar sajolida

Fix broken links to former /install/download/openpgp

parent 1dd3d809
...@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ When you reproducibly build our ISO you should obtain a file that is ...@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ When you reproducibly build our ISO you should obtain a file that is
exactly the same as the official Tails ISO image, thus, *our* signature exactly the same as the official Tails ISO image, thus, *our* signature
should be able to verify *your* ISO for you. should be able to verify *your* ISO for you.
[[Download and verify our OpenPGP signature|/install/download/openpgp]] [[Download and verify our OpenPGP signature|/install/download#openpgp]]
against your own ISO image. against your own ISO image.
### Verify with a checksum ### Verify with a checksum
......
...@@ -1279,8 +1279,7 @@ Checkout the release branch that is about to be merged into `master`: ...@@ -1279,8 +1279,7 @@ Checkout the release branch that is about to be merged into `master`:
use it to fetch the ISO image: use it to fetch the ISO image:
- `inc/stable_amd64_iso_url.html`: should contain exactly the expected - `inc/stable_amd64_iso_url.html`: should contain exactly the expected
ISO image URL. ISO image URL.
- `install/download/openpgp`: the `Tails ${VERSION} ISO image` - `install/download`: "Direct download" button.
link.
- `install/expert/usb`: in the `wget` command. - `install/expert/usb`: in the `wget` command.
If everything checks out ok, let the RM know so they can proceed with If everything checks out ok, let the RM know so they can proceed with
......
...@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Tails developers maintain several OpenPGP key pairs. ...@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Tails developers maintain several OpenPGP key pairs.
several fake and maybe malicious Tails keys on the key servers.</p> several fake and maybe malicious Tails keys on the key servers.</p>
<p>For example, if you first [[authenticate the Tails signing key <p>For example, if you first [[authenticate the Tails signing key
through the OpenPGP Web of Trust|install/download/openpgp#wot]], then through the OpenPGP Web of Trust|install/download#wot]], then
you can verify our others keys as they are all certified by the Tails you can verify our others keys as they are all certified by the Tails
signing key.</p> signing key.</p>
......
...@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ it](https://blog.torproject.org/blog/diginotar-debacle-and-what-you-should-do-ab ...@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ it](https://blog.torproject.org/blog/diginotar-debacle-and-what-you-should-do-ab
It is clear for us that getting an commercial SSL certificate is not enough to It is clear for us that getting an commercial SSL certificate is not enough to
strongly authenticate our website, and for example authenticity of our releases. strongly authenticate our website, and for example authenticity of our releases.
That's why we always propose you [[stronger ways of authenticating our Tails That's why we always propose you [[stronger ways of authenticating our Tails
release|install/download/openpgp]] using OpenPGP signatures. release|install/download#openpgp]] using OpenPGP signatures.
Why get a commercial certificate then? Why get a commercial certificate then?
====================================== ======================================
......
...@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Code ...@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Code
Documentation and website Documentation and website
========================= =========================
* sajolida rewrote the [instructions for OpenPGP verification](https://git-tails.immerda.ch/tails/tree/wiki/src/install/download/openpgp.mdwn?h=web/9323-replace-old-documentation) * sajolida rewrote the instructions for OpenPGP verification
as part of small improvements to make the installation assistant less as part of small improvements to make the installation assistant less
frustrating for power users. frustrating for power users.
......
...@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Documentation and website ...@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Documentation and website
- sajolida finished replacing the old installation instructions we had before - sajolida finished replacing the old installation instructions we had before
the installation assistant. This implied rewriting our instructions for the installation assistant. This implied rewriting our instructions for
[[OpenPGP verification|install/download/openpgp]] which now include a direct OpenPGP verification which now include a direct
download link. We are [[!tails_ticket 11024 desc="still discussing"]] how to download link. We are [[!tails_ticket 11024 desc="still discussing"]] how to
better link this page to make it easier to find. better link this page to make it easier to find.
......
...@@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ liar; the answer of a true liar would always be "no". ...@@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ liar; the answer of a true liar would always be "no".
- To verify the integrity of a DVD from a separate trusted system, you can - To verify the integrity of a DVD from a separate trusted system, you can
verify the signature of the ISO image as documented in [[verify the ISO image verify the signature of the ISO image as documented in [[verify the ISO image
using OpenPGP|install/download/openpgp]] using OpenPGP|install/download#openpgp]]
against the DVD itself. against the DVD itself.
- There is no documented method of verifying the integrity of a Tails USB stick - There is no documented method of verifying the integrity of a Tails USB stick
......
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