Fix broken links to former /install/download/openpgp

wiki/src/contribute/build/reproducible.mdwn

@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ When you reproducibly build our ISO you should obtain a file that is
 exactly the same as the official Tails ISO image, thus, *our* signature
 should be able to verify *your* ISO for you.
 
-[[Download and verify our OpenPGP signature|/install/download/openpgp]]
+[[Download and verify our OpenPGP signature|/install/download#openpgp]]
 against your own ISO image.
 
 ### Verify with a checksum

wiki/src/contribute/release_process.mdwn

@@ -1279,8 +1279,7 @@ Checkout the release branch that is about to be merged into `master`:
   use it to fetch the ISO image:
   - `inc/stable_amd64_iso_url.html`: should contain exactly the expected
     ISO image URL.
-  - `install/download/openpgp`: the `Tails ${VERSION} ISO image`
-    link.
+  - `install/download`: "Direct download" button.
   - `install/expert/usb`: in the `wget` command.
 
 If everything checks out ok, let the RM know so they can proceed with

wiki/src/doc/about/openpgp_keys.mdwn

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Tails developers maintain several OpenPGP key pairs.
 several fake and maybe malicious Tails keys on the key servers.</p>
 
 <p>For example, if you first [[authenticate the Tails signing key
-through the OpenPGP Web of Trust|install/download/openpgp#wot]], then
+through the OpenPGP Web of Trust|install/download#wot]], then
 you can verify our others keys as they are all certified by the Tails
 signing key.</p>
 

wiki/src/news/new_SSL_certificate.mdwn

@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ it](https://blog.torproject.org/blog/diginotar-debacle-and-what-you-should-do-ab
 It is clear for us that getting an commercial SSL certificate is not enough to
 strongly authenticate our website, and for example authenticity of our releases.
 That's why we always propose you [[stronger ways of authenticating our Tails
-release|install/download/openpgp]] using OpenPGP signatures.
+release|install/download#openpgp]] using OpenPGP signatures.
 
 Why get a commercial certificate then?
 ======================================

wiki/src/news/report_2016_04.mdwn

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Code
 Documentation and website
 =========================
 
-* sajolida rewrote the [instructions for OpenPGP verification](https://git-tails.immerda.ch/tails/tree/wiki/src/install/download/openpgp.mdwn?h=web/9323-replace-old-documentation)
+* sajolida rewrote the instructions for OpenPGP verification
   as part of small improvements to make the installation assistant less
   frustrating for power users.
 

wiki/src/news/report_2016_05.mdwn

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Documentation and website
 
 - sajolida finished replacing the old installation instructions we had before
   the installation assistant. This implied rewriting our instructions for
-  [[OpenPGP verification|install/download/openpgp]] which now include a direct
+  OpenPGP verification which now include a direct
   download link. We are [[!tails_ticket 11024 desc="still discussing"]] how to
   better link this page to make it easier to find.
 

wiki/src/support/faq.mdwn

@@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ liar; the answer of a true liar would always be "no".
 
 - To verify the integrity of a DVD from a separate trusted system, you can
   verify the signature of the ISO image as documented in [[verify the ISO image
-  using OpenPGP|install/download/openpgp]]
+  using OpenPGP|install/download#openpgp]]
   against the DVD itself.
 
 - There is no documented method of verifying the integrity of a Tails USB stick