Commit 9b931344 authored by sajolida's avatar sajolida
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Merge branch 'doc/17882-identities'

parents 09b09e5f 3562a438
......@@ -242,30 +242,32 @@ anonymously publish a document. That is, unless you're OK with an adversary bein
Adversaries could relate different tasks done in a Tails session by:
* Analyzing your Tor circuits
* Gaining access to your [[Persistent Storage|doc/first_steps/persistence/]]
- **Analyzing your Tor circuits**
## Tor circuits
Tails and the Tor Browser naturally connect to different websites via different [[circuits in the Tor network|doc/anonymous_internet/tor_status]].
But if you connect to the same website several times in one session,
like logging into two accounts on the same social media website, Tails and the Tor Browser
use the same circuit, and all the activity on that website could be linked by an adversary.
Tails and the Tor Browser naturally connect to different websites via different [[circuits in the Tor network|doc/anonymous_internet/tor_status]].
But if you connect to the same website several times in one session,
like logging into two accounts on the same social media website, Tails and the Tor Browser
use the same circuit. This website could then link those activities by noting
that they come from the same Tor circuit.
To ensure you use new Tor circuits for Internet traffic:
To ensure you use new Tor circuits for Internet traffic:
* if you just use the Tor Browser, you can click its [[**New Identity** button|anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser]] to create a new circuit, or
* if you use multiple programs to connect to the Internet, you can restart Tails.
* If you only use the Tor Browser to connect to the Internet, you can click its [[**New Identity** button|anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser]] to create a new circuit.
* If you use multiple applications, you can restart Tails.
## Persistent Storage
You can prevent Persistent Storage information from being linked
to other activities by switching between several USB sticks that run Tails.
That way the Persistent Storage of, say, your activist email in Thunderbird can be kept separate
from your use of Tails for work.
For more about how Tor does or does not preserve anonymity, see the [Tor Project's support pages](https://support.torproject.org/#staying-anonymous).
We also recommend this step if you worry about
someone gaining physical access to your computer or USB sticks, or if you have to use Tails on an insecure or public computer (although [[Tails can't protect against compromised hardware|/doc/about/warning.html#compromised_hardware]]).
- **Gaining access to your [[Persistent Storage|doc/first_steps/persistence/]]**
For more about how Tor does or does not preserve anonymity, see the [Tor Project's documentation](https://support.torproject.org/#staying-anonymous).
You can prevent the information in your Persistent Storage from being linked
to other activities by switching between several USB sticks that run Tails.
That way the Persistent Storage of, say, your activist email in *Thunderbird* can be kept separate
from your use of Tails for work.
We also recommend this step if you worry about someone gaining physical access
to your computer or USB sticks. This is particularly a concern if you have to
use Tails on an insecure or public computer, because
[[Tails can't protect against compromised hardware|/doc/about/warning#compromised_hardware]].
<h1 id="passwords">Tails doesn't make your crappy passwords stronger</h1>
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