Commit 917566c3 authored by intrigeri's avatar intrigeri
Browse files

Merge branch 'testing' into devel

parents 852e1be7 803081ca
This diff is collapsed.
......@@ -46,7 +46,6 @@ apt-get --yes purge \
### Deinstall some other unwanted packages.
apt-get --yes purge \
'^aptitude*' \
'^geoclue*' \
krb5-locales \
libdvdcss2-dbgsym \
live-build \
......@@ -56,5 +55,11 @@ apt-get --yes purge \
tasksel-data \
tcpd
### Deinstall some other unwanted packages whose regexp might not be match
### anything when building with partial, tagged APT snapshots.
if [ $(dpkg --get-selections | grep -c -E '^geoclue') -gt 0 ]; then
apt-get --yes purge '^geoclue*'
fi
### Deinstall dependencies of the just removed packages.
apt-get --yes --purge autoremove
tails (3.12) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium
* Dummy entry for next major release.
* Dummy entry for next release.
-- Tails developers <tails@boum.org> Fri, 17 Aug 2018 17:08:40 +0000
tails (3.9~rc1) unstable; urgency=medium
* Major changes
- Integrate the Additional Software Packages feature into the desktop
and revamp the interface of "Configure Persistent Volume".
- Support TrueCrypt/VeraCrypt encrypted volumes on the desktop.
- Upgrade Tor Browser to 8.0a9, based on Firefox 60 ESR (Closes: #15023).
Notable user-visible changes and relevant details:
· Drop search engine customization and stick to Tor Browser's defaults.
· Upgrade uBlock Origin to its WebExtension version and now rely
on the filter lists shipped in the Debian package.
· Tweak the number of web content processes to work better with 2 GiB
of RAM (Closes: #15716).
· Revamp how we're handling our custom prefs, drop obsolete ones,
reduce our delta with pristine Tor Browser.
- Upgrade Thunderbird to 60.0b10 (Closes: #15091). Notable details:
· Install Torbirdy 0.2.5 from stretch-backports and drop our patches
that were merged upstream.
· Enable the optional part of the fixes for EFAIL (Closes: #15602).
- Upgrade Linux to 4.17 (Closes: #15763).
- Upgrade tor to 0.3.4.6-rc (Closes: #15770).
- Upgrade to Debian Stretch 9.5.
* Security fixes
- Upgrade CUPS to 2.2.1-8+deb9u2 (DSA-4243).
- Upgrade Exiv2 to 0.25-3.1+deb9u1 (DSA-4238).
- Upgrade FUSE to 2.9.7-1+deb9u1 (DSA-4257).
- Upgrade GDM to 3.22.3-3+deb9u2 (DSA-4270).
- Upgrade libsoup to 2.56.0-2+deb9u2 (DSA-4241).
- Upgrade Imagemagick to 8:6.9.7.4+dfsg-11+deb9u5 (DSA-4245).
- Upgrade ffmpeg to 7:3.2.12-1~deb9u1 (DSA-4258, DSA-4249).
- Upgrade libmspack to 0.5-1+deb9u2 (DSA-4260).
- Upgrade Samba to 2:4.5.12+dfsg-2+deb9u3 (DSA-4271).
- Upgrade the Apache XML Security for C++ library to 1.7.3-4+deb9u1
(DSA-4265).
* Bugfixes
- Don't display the Enigmail configuration wizard in every Tails session
(Closes: #15693, #15746). Fix against Tails 3.8.
- Make the torstatus GNOME Shell extension actually translatable
(Closes: #15715). Fix against the first Tails release that included
this extension.
- Drop Icedove → Thunderbird migration code which started causing trouble.
- Tails Installer:
· Link to upgrade documentation when upgrading (Closes: #7904).
· Show the reinstall option only when the device is big enough to make
a full reinstallation (Closes: #14810).
· Make the main window fit in a 600px-high screen (Closes: #14849).
· Show the correct device size in the reinstall confirmation dialog
(Closes: #15590).
- Tails Greeter: don't display file:/// URLs to users (Closes: #15582).
* Minor improvements and updates
- Install Mesa and libdrm* from stretch-backports and upgrade the Nouveau
X.Org video driver to 1.0.15. This improves support for some graphics
cards such as NVIDIA Pascal series (Closes: #14910)
- htpdate: improve diagnostics output when the date header can't be fetched.
- Onion Grater: support named AppArmor profiles.
- Update Onion Grater's config for new Tor Browser AppArmor profile name.
- Enable e10s in the Unsafe Browser.
- Delete all search plugins for the Unsafe Browser (Closes: #15708).
- Display a deprecation warning when starting Liferea (#11082).
- Upgrade VirtualBox guest modules to 5.2.16-dfsg-3~bpo9+2.
- Use Tor Browser for browsing the documentation even when offline
(Closes: #15720).
- Provide feedback while Tor Browser, "Tails documentation"
or "Report an error" are starting (Closes: #15101).
- WhisperBack: remove the right pane (Closes: #7180).
- tails-debugging-info: return machine-readable, structured data.
Adjust WhisperBack accordingly (Closes: #8514). This paves the way
towards more usable bug reports (#8722).
- Port lots of our Perl code to more lightweight libraries.
This decreases the amount of memory used by Tails Upgrader and by the
persistence configuration interface.
- Do not hide applications that require an admin password (Closes: #11013).
- Try unlocking every persistent volume when multiple ones are
available (Closes: #15653).
- Upgrade Electrum to 3.1.3-1~bpo9+1.
- Upgrade most firmware to 20180518-1.
- Upgrade Intel microcode to 3.20180703.2~bpo9+1.
- Upgrade AMD microcode to 3.20180524.1.
* Build system
- Drop AppArmor feature set pinning: this is now done in Debian Stretch
(Closes: #15341).
- Remove the now unused deb.torproject.org sid APT source (Closes: #15638).
- Install OnionShare from our custom APT repo instead of from sid.
We've mistakenly tracked sid for a while and it has become a problem,
so stick to the version that works for us until Tails 4.0.
- Fix building the ISO on zfs by dropping the cache=none setting for
vmproxy's storage (Closes: #14404).
- Update the Vagrant basebox for any change under vagrant/.
Previously, some relevant changes were not effective until something under
vagrant/definitions/tails-builder/ was changed.
- Make intltool ignore .py files: `intltool-update --maintain` seems to be
buggy with .py files.
- Refresh our CUPS AppArmor profile patch to apply on 2.2.1-8+deb9u2.
- Make it more obvious that the .orig file check is fatal (Closes: #15727).
- Delete baseboxes once they're 6 months old instead of 4.
This is more in line with the delay between our major releases these days.
- Rename /usr/share/amnesia to /usr/share/tails. It was about time.
- Abort the build if /etc/{passwd,group} has changed (Closes: #15419).
Such changes can break Tails after an automatic upgrade was applied
so let's detect it ASAP. Consequently, ensure a few GIDs that wanted
to play musical chairs are the same as in Tails 3.8 (Closes: #15695).
- Don't fail the build if the APT lists don't include any package
whose name matches ^geoclue.
* Test suite
- Adjust to the new tails-persistence-setup API.
- Update the Tor Browser's AppArmor profile name.
- Re-enable the "I can print the current page […]" test.
- Update tests wrt. the fact tails-upgrade-frontend-wrapper was ported
to Python (Closes: #15379).
- Make a test more robust by waiting for the page to have loaded.
- Adjust to the fact the WhisperBack debugging info is now configured
in a machine-readable file.
- Remove test for tails-debugging-info, that has been a no-op for a while.
- Adjust for Tor Browser 8.
- Make the "I open the address" step more robust and accordingly
stop marking the tests that use it in the Unsafe Browser
as fragile (refs: #14771).
- De-duplicate a number of images of standard GTK+ 3 widgets.
- Make the audio and WebM tests more robust.
- Make the "I start the Tor Browser in offline mode" step more robust.
- Make the "AppArmor has (not )? denied" step more robust.
- Don't try and use XVFB_PID if it's not set (Closes: #15730).
- Adjust Pidgin test to use a certificate that's still in Debian
(Closes: #15762).
- Use a hopefully more reliable public GnuPG key and make tests
more robust against new subkeys being added (Closes: #15771).
- Stop hard-coding the list of RTL Tor Browser locales.
- Fix the "Unsafe Browser can be used in all languages supported in Tails"
test for locales that have a translated homepage (Closes: #11711).
- Take into account that apt(8) won't return when run in the remote shell
with the ASP hooks enabled.
-- Tails developers <tails@boum.org> Thu, 16 Aug 2018 18:37:47 +0000
tails (3.8) unstable; urgency=medium
* Security fixes
......
......@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ Then /^a Tails persistence partition exists on USB drive "([^"]+)"$/ do |name|
end
Given /^I enable persistence$/ do
@screen.wait_and_click('TailsGreeterPersistencePassphrase.png', 10)
@screen.wait_and_click('TailsGreeterPersistencePassphrase.png', 60)
@screen.type(@persistence_password + Sikuli::Key.ENTER)
@screen.wait('TailsGreeterPersistenceUnlocked.png', 30)
end
......
......@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ gbp dch \
`if [ ${SNAPSHOT} = no -a -z ${SINCE} ]; then echo "--auto" ; fi` \
--new-version="${NEW_VERSION}" \
--ignore-branch \
--dch-opt=--force-bad-version \
-- '*' ':!wiki' \
|| fatal "gbp dch failed."
......
# /dev/random and /dev/urandom radomness seeding in Tails
/dev/random and /dev/urandom are special Linux devices that provide access from
user land to the Linux kernel Cryptographically Secure Pseudo Random Number
Generator (CSPRNG). This generator is used for almost every security protocol,
like TLS/SSL key generation, choosing TCP sequences, ASLR offsets, and GPG key
generation [1]. In order for this CSPRNG to be really cryptographically secure,
it's recommended to seed it with a 'good' entropy source, even though The Linux
kernel collects entropy from several sources, for example keyboard typing,
mouse movement, among others.
Because of the Tails nature of being amnesic, and run from different type of
live devices (from DVDs to USB sticks), special care must be taken to ensure
the system still gets enough entropy and boots with enough randomness. This is
not easy in the Tails context, where the system is almost always booting the
same way. Even the squashfs file is ordered to optimize boot time.
Although these problem have been documented since a long time (see [7] and
[8]), there's not much done to tackle the problem. We looked at notes and
research from LiveCD OS's and supply them here for completements sake. Whonix
has a [wiki page](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Dev/Entropy) with some notes, and
Qubes has tickets about this ([3],[4],[5] and [6]).
/dev/random and /dev/urandom are special Linux devices that provide
access from user land to the Linux kernel Cryptographically Secure
Pseudo Random Number Generator (CSPRNG). This generator is used for
almost every security protocol, like TLS/SSL key generation, choosing
TCP sequences, ASLR offsets, and GPG key generation
[https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/086.pdf]. In order for this CSPRNG to
indeed be cryptographically secure, it's recommended to seed it with a
'good' entropy source, even though The Linux kernel collects entropy
from several sources, for example keyboard typing, mouse movement, among
others.
Because of Tails' feature of being amnesic, and run from different types
of live devices (from DVDs to USB sticks), special care must be taken to
ensure the system gets enough entropy and boots with enough randomness.
This proves to be hard within the Tails context, where the system is
almost always booting the same way. Even the squashfs file is ordered to
optimize boot time.
Although these problems have been documented since a long time (see
[https://www.av8n.com/computer/htm/secure-random.htm] and
[http://www.av8n.com/computer/htm/fixup-live-cd.htm]), there's not much
done to tackle the problem. We looked at notes and research from LiveCD
OS's and supply them here for completeness' sake. Whonix has a [wiki
page](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Dev/Entropy) with some notes, and
Qubes has tickets about this
([http://wiki.qubes-os.org/trac/ticket/673],
[https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/1311],
[https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/qubes-devel/Q65boPAbqbE/9ZOZUInQCgAJ],
[https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/qubes-devel/5wI8ygbaohk]).
## Current situation
See the related [[design document|contribute/design/random]]
Tails do not ship /var/lib/urandom/random-seed in the ISO, since it means
shipping a fixed known value for every Tails installation which means its
entropy contribution is zero, and breaks reproducibility of the ISO image.
Tails does not ship /var/lib/urandom/random-seed in the ISO, since it
means shipping a fixed known value for every Tails installation, which
in turn means that entropy contribution would zero. Furthermore, this
breaks reproducibility of the ISO image.
Without this random seed, systemd-random-seed won't write anything to
/dev/urandom, so we rely purely on the kernel CSPRNG and current system entropy
......@@ -39,8 +49,8 @@ Tails ships Haveged and rngd since a while. Still there are concerns about
Haveged's reliability to provide cryptographically secure randomness, and rngd
is only really useful when random generator devices are used.
Taking other measures to seed the Linux Kernel CSPRNG with good material is
something worst spending efforts on.
Taking other measures to seed the Linux Kernel CSPRNG with good material seems
worth spending efforts on.
## Use cases
......@@ -55,33 +65,33 @@ add one.
On the other hand, that's not the installation method we want to support the
most, and probably not the most used when people want to secure other
communication types than HTTPS (e.g persistence is very usefull for OpenPGP key
communication types than HTTPS (e.g persistence is very useful for OpenPGP key
storage and usage, chat account configuration, ...).
So we may eventually just document somewhere to users that they MUST NOT use
this type of installation if they want to rely on good cryptograpy for their
this type of installation if they want to rely on good cryptography for their
communications and key generation, or that they should wait after having
interacting a long (but hard to define) time with the system so that it had time
interacted a long (but hard to define) time with the system so that it had time
to collect entropy, and does not rely on the CSPRNG, Haveged and rngd only.
We could also add some kind of notification to users when entropy gets too low,
or just saying them that the way they use Tails is not compatible with strong
or just tell them that the way they use Tails is not compatible with strong
cryptography.
### Intermediary USB
This type of installation is supposed to be used when people are installing
Tails from another OS (except Debian and Ubuntu, where they can use the Tails
installer). In most case, this means having a bit by bit copy of the Tails ISO
installer). In most cases, this means having a bit-by-bit copy of the Tails ISO
on the USB stick, except for Windows where we ask to use the [Universal USB
Installer](http://www.pendrivelinux.com/universal-usb-installer-easy-as-1-2-3/)
In this case the situation is pretty much the same than with the DVD one. No
seed, and adding one is very difficult if not impossible (except with the
seed. And adding one is very difficult if not impossible (except with the
Windows installation where we may ask upstream to implement that in the
Universal USB Installer, but well...).
That's also not really the way we encourge users to use Tails, so as with DVD
That's also not really the way we encourage users to use Tails, so as with DVD
there's maybe no point to fix the situation here, and the same workaround could
be applied (document it).
......@@ -92,10 +102,11 @@ That's supposed to be the standard way to use Tails.
Note that in this case, there are two situations: booting this installation
with persistence enabled, and without.
It is worth noting too that the first time this Tails installation is booted,
most of the time the first step is to configure persistence, which means
creating an encrypted partition. At this step though, there is at the moment
probably very little entropy, so this may weaken the LUKS volume encryption.
It is worth noting that the first time this Tails installation is
booted, most of the time the first step is to configure persistence,
which means creating an encrypted partition. At this step though, there
is probably very little entropy at this moment, which may weaken the
LUKS volume encryption.
### Virtual Machines
......@@ -120,6 +131,9 @@ partition is created.
### Use the Tails installer to create a better seed [[!tails_ticket 11897]]
Note that we'll likely soon distribute a USB image and won't use Tails
installer anymore for creating Tails devices. [[!tails_ticket 15292]]
Tails installer can be used on Debian and Ubuntu, and is the tool people
running OSX or Windows are told to use to install their final Tails
USB stick with, by using an intermediary Tails to create the final USB.
......@@ -128,32 +142,34 @@ Tails installer could store a seed in the FAT filesystem of the system
partition. That would workaround this first boot problem not handled by the
persistence option.
We can't sadly update this seed while running Tails, as mounting RW the system
We sadly can't update this seed while running Tails, as read-write mounting the system
FAT partition during a Tails session does not work. So the question whether updating it
or not is open.
If we want to do so, we'll have to update it at the system shutdown. This will
mean remount this partition, write the new random seed, then unmount it and
start the shutdown of the system. Obviously we can do this only in normal
shutdown process, and will have to avoid it in emergency shutdown mode.
shutdown process, and we'll have to avoid it in emergency shutdown mode.
We may alternatively not update it, and use it only when the persistence is not
enabled. That would still be a unique source of entropy per Tails installation,
so that would be a better situation that the current one.
so that would be a better situation than the current one.
One drawback: this would break the ability to verify this system partition with
a simple shasum operation.
### Use stronger/more entropy collectors [[!tails_ticket 5650]]
As already stated, Tails run Haveged, and rngd (since 2.6 for the later).
As already stated, Tails runs Haveged, and rngd (since 2.6 for the later).
We may want to add other sources though, given there are concerns about Haveged,
and rngd starts only when a hardware RNG is detected, which is not so often the
case.
XXX: It would be nice to have a study (read: a survey of packages, etc) of all the
useful entropy gathering daemons that might be of use on a Tails system. (and have this tested on computers with/without intel rng or things like an entropykey)
XXX: It would be nice to have a study (read: a survey of packages, etc)
of all the useful entropy gathering daemons that might be of use on a
Tails system. (and have this tested on computers with/without intel rng
or things like an entropykey)
An evaluation of some of them [has been done
already](https://volumelabs.net/best-random-data-software/)
......@@ -167,26 +183,26 @@ Possible candidates:
* randomsound: probably a bad idea in the Tails context as we're discussing a
Greeter option to deactivate the microphone.
### Block booting till enough entropy has been gathered
### Block booting until enough entropy has been gathered
One way to ensure Tails is booting with enough entropy would be to block during
the boot if the system is lacking of it.
One way to ensure Tails is booting with enough entropy would be to block
the boot while the system is lacking it.
But this brings questions about how to interact correctly with the users,
as blocking without notifications would be terrible UX. Also Tails boot time is
a bit long already, and this may grow it quite a bit more again.
XXX: So before going on, we need a bit more data about the state of the entropy when
Tails boot, specially now that we have several entropy collector daemons. It may
very well be that this case do not happen anymore. And if it is, we need to know
on average how much time that blocking would last. [Sycamoreone] [[!tails_ticket
Tails boots, especially now that we have several entropy collector daemons. It may
very well be that this case does not happen anymore. And if it does, we need to know
on average how much time that blocking would last. [[!tails_ticket
11758]]
### Regulary check available entropy and notify if low
An idea that has been mentioned several time is to have a service that
check if the available entropy is high enough, and notify the user if
it's not the case. One downside, is that observing the entropy pool costs
An idea that has been mentioned several times is to have a service that
checks if the available entropy is high enough, and notifies the user if
it's not the case. One downside is, that observing the entropy pool costs
randomness, so this may have to be implemented with care or is worth
discussing/researching the costs/benefits.
......@@ -195,15 +211,8 @@ discussing/researching the costs/benefits.
This is about [[!tails_ticket 7642]], [[!tails_ticket 7675]],
[[!tails_ticket 6116]], [[!tails_ticket 11897]] and friends.
## References
* [1] <https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/086.pdf>
* [2] <https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/338.pdf>
* [3] <http://wiki.qubes-os.org/trac/ticket/673>
* [4] <https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/1311>
* [5] <https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/qubes-devel/Q65boPAbqbE/9ZOZUInQCgAJ>
* [6] <https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/qubes-devel/5wI8ygbaohk>
* [7] <https://www.av8n.com/computer/htm/secure-random.htm>
* [8] <http://www.av8n.com/computer/htm/fixup-live-cd.htm>
* [9] <https://www.python.org/dev/peps/pep-0506/>
* [10]<https://docs.python.org/2/library/os.html#os.urandom>
## More references
* <https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/338.pdf>
* <https://www.python.org/dev/peps/pep-0506/>
* <https://docs.python.org/2/library/os.html#os.urandom>
......@@ -328,11 +328,11 @@ just appeared:
After a new Tails release is out
--------------------------------
If you just put out a final release:
### If you just put out a final release
* [[merge `stable` or `testing` into
`devel`|APT_repository/custom#workflow-merge-main-branch]]
* increment the version number in devel's `debian/changelog` to match
* increment the version number in `devel`'s `debian/changelog` to match
the next major release, so that
next builds from the `devel` branch do not use the APT suite meant
for the last release:
......@@ -356,20 +356,6 @@ If you just put out a final release:
git commit debian/changelog \
-m "Add dummy changelog entry for ${NEXT_PLANNED_MINOR_VERSION:?}."
If you just released a RC (XXX: please automate these steps during the
3.2~rc1 release process, based on the above commands):
* add a dummy changelog entry (for the upcoming, non-RC version) in
the branch used for the release (`stable` or `testing`), so that the
next builds from it do not use the APT suite meant for the RC
* add a dummy changelog entry (for the release *after* the one you
released a RC for) in the branch used for the release (`stable` or
`testing`), so that the next builds from it do not use the APT suite
meant for the RC (XXX: I don't understand what this is about; is it
instead about adding an entry for that release on the `devel`
branch? -- intrigeri)
If the release was a major one, then:
1. [[Hard reset the stable APT suite to
......@@ -382,6 +368,30 @@ If the release was a major one, then:
git commit config/APT_overlays.d/ \
-m "Empty the list of APT overlays: they were merged"
### Else, if you just released a RC
* increment the version number in `debian/changelog` on the branch
used for the release, to match the upcoming non-RC release, so that
the next builds from it do not use the APT suite meant for the RC:
cd "${RELEASE_CHECKOUT}" && \
git checkout "${RELEASE_BRANCH:?}" && \
dch --newversion "${NEXT_PLANNED_MAJOR_VERSION:?}" \
"Dummy entry for next release." && \
git commit debian/changelog \
-m "Add dummy changelog entry for ${NEXT_PLANNED_MAJOR_VERSION:?}."
* increment the version number in `devel`'s `debian/changelog` to
match the second next major release, so that images built from there
have the right version number:
cd "${RELEASE_CHECKOUT}" && \
git checkout devel && \
dch --newversion "${SECOND_NEXT_PLANNED_MAJOR_VERSION:?}" \
"Dummy entry for next release." && \
git commit debian/changelog \
-m "Add dummy changelog entry for ${SECOND_NEXT_PLANNED_MAJOR_VERSION:?}."
Giving access to a core developer
---------------------------------
......
......@@ -4,10 +4,6 @@ All times are referenced to Berlin and Paris time.
## 2018Q3
* 2018-08-16: Build and upload tentative 3.9~rc1 ISO image — intrigeri
* 2018-08-17: Test and release 3.9~rc1 — intrigeri
* 2018-09-03, 19:00: [[Contributors meeting|contribute/meetings]]
* 2018-09-04: Build and upload tentative 3.9 ISO image — intrigeri
......@@ -19,17 +15,17 @@ All times are referenced to Berlin and Paris time.
* 2018-10-03, 19:00: [[Contributors meeting|contribute/meetings]]
* 2018-10-23: **Release 3.10** (Firefox 60.3, bugfix release) — anonym is the RM
* 2018-10-23: **Release 3.10** (Firefox 60.3, bugfix release)
* 2018-11-06, 19:00: [[Contributors meeting|contribute/meetings]]
* 2018-12-03, 19:00: [[Contributors meeting|contribute/meetings]]
* 2018-12-11: **Release 3.11** (Firefox 60.4, major release) — anonym is the RM
* 2018-12-11: **Release 3.11** (Firefox 60.4, bugfix release)
## 2019Q1
* 2019-01-29: **Release 3.12** (Firefox 60.5)
* 2019-01-29: **Release 3.12** (Firefox 60.5, major release)
* 2019-03-19: **Release 3.13** (Firefox 60.6)
......
......@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ To release Tails you'll need some packages installed:
`debian/control` in the `debian` branch of its repo)
* `tails-perl5lib` dependencies (same trick as `tails-iuk` to get the
list)
* `po4a` _from Stretch_: the version in testing/sid extracts Markdown headings
in a different way, which makes tons of strings fuzzy.
Environment
===========
......@@ -38,7 +40,14 @@ the scripts snippets found on this page:
* `NEXT_PLANNED_VERSION`: set to the version number of the next Tails release
(e.g. 0.23 when releasing 0.22.1, and 1.3 when releasing 1.2)
* `NEXT_PLANNED_MAJOR_VERSION`: set to the version number of the next
*major* Tails release
*major* Tails release; if you're preparing a RC for a major release,
use that major release; otherwise, use whatever the next planned
major release is
* `SECOND_NEXT_PLANNED_MAJOR_VERSION`: set to the version number of
the second next *major* Tails release; e.g. if preparing the RC for
the 3.9 major release, then set this to 3.12 (3.9 is the next major
release, 3.10 and 3.11 are bugfix releases, 3.12 is a major
release).
* `NEXT_PLANNED_MINOR_VERSION`: set to the version number of the next
*minor* Tails release; if the next release is a point-release, use
that one; otherwise, use `${VERSION}.1`
......@@ -264,19 +273,22 @@ Update other base branches
1. Merge the release branch into `devel` following the instructions for
[[merging base branches|APT_repository/custom#workflow-merge-main-branch]].
2. Merge `devel` into `feature/buster`, *without* following the instructions for
2. [[Thaw|APT_repository/time-based snapshots#thaw]], on the devel
branch, the time-based APT repository snapshots that were used
during the freeze.
3. Merge `devel` into `feature/buster`, *without* following the instructions for
[[merging base branches|APT_repository/custom#workflow-merge-main-branch]].
(For now `feature/buster` is handled as any other topic branch
forked off `devel`: its base branch is set to `devel`.)
If the merge conflicts don't look like something you feel confident
resolving properly, abort this merge and let the Foundations
Team know.
3. Ensure that the release, `devel` and `feature/buster` branches
4. Ensure that the release, `devel` and `feature/buster` branches
have the expected content in `config/APT_overlays.d/`: e.g. it must
not list any overlay APT suite that has been merged already.
4. [[Thaw|APT_repository/time-based snapshots#thaw]], on the devel
branch, the time-based APT repository snapshots that were used
during the freeze.
5. Push the modified branches to Git:
git push origin \
......@@ -493,19 +505,18 @@ SquashFS file order
1. Start *Tor Browser*.
1. A few minutes later, once the `boot-profile` process has been
killed, retrieve the new sort file from `/var/log/boot-profile`.
1. Backup the old sort file: `cp config/binary_rootfs/squashfs.sort{,.old}`
1. Copy the new sort file to `config/binary_rootfs/squashfs.sort`.
1. Cleanup a bit:
- remove `var/log/live/config.pipe`: otherwise the boot is broken
or super-slow
- remove the bits about `kill-boot-profile` at the end: they're
only useful when profiling the boot
1. Inspect the Git diff (including diff stat), apply common sense.
The following command is also helpful but requires that you save a
copy of the old sort file into `/tmp/squashfs.sort.old`:
1. Inspect the Git diff (including diff stat), apply common sense: