Commit 6c02a880 authored by intrigeri's avatar intrigeri
Browse files

Revert spam.

parent 9316c33d
[[!map pages="blueprint/SponsorW/*"]]
[[!meta title="Identity"]]
Provocateurs, 2019-01
- [Tails - The Fighter.pdf](
- [Tails - The Hacker.pdf](
- [Tails - The Protector.pdf](
- [Tails - The Provider.pdf](
Unified version, 2019-02
- [Tails - Identity v3.pdf](
......@@ -21,10 +21,10 @@ beginning of May.
- March 2019: sajolida
- April 2019: TheNerdyAnarchist & emmapeel
- May 2019: u
- June 2019: emmapeel
- July 2019: sajolida
- June 2019: sajolida
- July 2019: muri
- August 2019: intrigeri
- September 2019:
- September 2019: muri
- October 2019: u
- November 2019:
- December 2019:
......@@ -31,19 +31,41 @@ XXX: If you feel like it and developers, foundation team, and RMs don't do it th
Documentation and website
XXX: If you feel like it and technical writers don't do it
themselves, explore the Git history:
- We updated most of our documentation to Tails based on Debian 10
(Buster). ([[!tails_ticket 16282]])
git log --patch --since='1 October' --until='1 November' origin/master -- "doc**.*m*" "about**.*m*" "support**.*m*" "install**.*m*" "upgrade**.*m*"
- We simplified and updated our description of the system requirements.
([[!tails_ticket 11663]] and [[!tails_ticket 16810]]).
- We fixed the display of the "Tor check" button on the homepage of *Tor
Browser*. ([[!tails_ticket 15312]])
It is used by around 10% of users.
- We removed the "% translated" indication from our website because it was
misleading. ([[!tails_ticket 16867]])
User experience
XXX: If you feel like it and the UX team does not do it
themselves, check the archives of tails-ux:
- [Odile Carabantes]( and [Enso
Studio]( created an animation on
[[using the boot menu to start Tails|install/win/usb#animation]].
- We tested 2 alternatives to *Etcher* as it has some privacy issues
([[!tails_ticket 16381]]):
- Rawrite32 ([[!tails_ticket 16553]])
- Win32 Disk Images ([[!tails_ticket 14447]])
- We proposed some small improvements to adjust *Tails Installer* to the
fact that we are now distributing USB images:
XXX: Use in Hong-Kong.
- Rename *Tails Installer* as *Tails Cloner* ([[!tails_ticket 16907]])
- Use USB images instead of ISO images in *Tails Installer* ([[!tails_ticket 16906]])
- We proposed a design to [[use *Tails Installer* to backup the
persistent volume|blueprint/backups]].
Hot topics on our help desk
......@@ -59,14 +81,22 @@ XXX: Ask to list hot topics for the last month.
- We finished fixing the description of the mechanism for the
[[revocation of the Tails signing
key|doc/about/openpgp_keys/signing_key_revocation]] after an external
review. ([[!tails_ticket 15604]])
- We discussed additions of new people to the mechanism.
XXX: The fundraising team should look at the fundraising Git.
- Our proposal to the [Mozilla Open Source Support](
was accepted. It will fund our work to:
git log --patch --since='1 December' --until='1 January' origin/master
XXX: The fundraising and accounting teams should look at the archives of <> and <>.
- Improve Upgrades, late 2019 and early 2020 ([[!tails_ticket 8415]] and [[!tails_ticket 15281]])
- Support Secure Boot, mid 2020 ([[!tails_ticket 6560]])
- Migrate to GitLab, early 2020 ([[!tails_ticket 15878]])
......@@ -82,12 +112,15 @@ On-going discussions
XXX: Link to the thread on <>.
Press and testimonials
- We asked for comments on a proposal for a "People" page on our website that
would be both trustworthy, human, and respect our pseudonyms:
- We asked for comments on the proposal to use *Tails Installer* to backup the
persistent volume:
XXX: Copy content from press/media_appearances_2018.mdwn
This page is continuously updated by, so if
it's empty there might be nothing special to report.
[[!meta title="Replace TrueCrypt"]]
Due to various concerns, TrueCrypt is about to be replaced in Tails,
either by tcplay or cryptsetup.
This is the blueprint for [[!tails_ticket 5373]] and subtasks.
<div class="caution">
This has been resolved by including cryptsetup 1.6.
See the aforementioned ticket for details.
# Candidate alternatives
## Tc-play
[tc-play]( is a Free implementation
of TrueCrypt based on dm-crypt, licensed under the 2-clause BSD license.
It is in Debian Jessie and wheezy-backports ([[!debpts tcplay]]), and
would serve as a full replacement of TrueCrypt... once a proper
GUI available.
tc-play allows to create TrueCrypt volumes.
version 2 added an ability to save and restore TrueCrypt volume headers to
external header files.This feature can be used to change a TrueCrypt volume
## Cryptsetup
[Cryptsetup 1.6 supports reading the TrueCrypt
on-disk format](,
so if/when udisks and friends are adapted (if needed), then we could
as well avoid shipping any additional software at all. It is part of
Debian Jessie.
Once unlocked on the command-line, the TC volume shows up in Nautilus,
but no udisks / GNOME Disks / Nautilus integration is here to enable
the user to graphically activate a TC volume.
Upstream (udisks) feature request:
cryptsetup 1.6.4 does not support creating TrueCrypt volumes.
Backporting cryptsetup 1.6.4-4 for Wheezy [is
## Zulucrypt
[zuluCrypt]( is a front end to cryptsetup
and tcplay, it make easy to manage Truecrypt
volumes through a GUI, but it's not packaged in Debian yet
([[!debbug 703911 desc="RFP #703911"]]).
- It uses cryptsetup to unlock TrueCrypt volumes and LUKS volumes.
- It uses cryptsetup to backup and restore LUKS volume headers.
- It uses cryptsetup to add and remove keys in LUKS volumes.
- It uses tcplay to create TrueCrypt volumes.
- It uses tcplay to backup and restore TrueCrypt volume headers
zuluCrypt now has a [hidden volume like functionality using
zuluCrypt can open [LUKS volumes with a detached
......@@ -162,6 +162,9 @@ Access control
translators sufficient access rights so that they can do their job,
even without anyone at Tails personally knowing any of them.
- Suggested translations are used to build the [[staging
### Currently implemented proposal
- In Weblate lingo, we use the [dedicated
......@@ -213,11 +216,14 @@ Access control
and tell us what their user name is.
- One can request reviewer status to Weblate administrators, who
will accept this request if, and only if, a sufficient amount of
work was done by the requesting translator (this can be checked on
the user's page, e.g.
In other words, we use proof-of-work to increase the cost of attacks.
1. Accept this request if, and only if, a sufficient amount of
work was done by the requesting translator (this can be checked on
the user's page, e.g.
In other words, we use proof-of-work to increase the cost of attacks.
2. Let <> and all the other Weblate reviewers
know about this status change.
- Bootstrapping a new language
......@@ -232,6 +238,7 @@ Access control
- Is the resulting UX good enough? Would it help if we allowed them
to vote up suggestions, even if this does not result in the
suggestion to be accepted as a validated translation?
(At the moment, suggestion voting is disabled.)
Weblate installation and maintenance - a hybrid approach
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