Commit 40adc48e authored by IkiWiki's avatar IkiWiki

updated PO files

parent 04a33342
Pipeline #737 passed with stage
in 16 minutes and 25 seconds
......@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ msgid ""
msgstr ""
"Project-Id-Version: Tails\n"
"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: tails-l10n@boum.org\n"
"POT-Creation-Date: 2020-12-16 21:28+0000\n"
"POT-Creation-Date: 2020-12-17 19:36+0000\n"
"PO-Revision-Date: 2019-11-22 16:47+0000\n"
"Last-Translator: Muri Nicanor <muri@immerda.ch>\n"
"Language-Team: Tails translators <tails@boum.org>\n"
......@@ -441,57 +441,74 @@ msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
msgid "<h1 id=\"confirmation\">Confirmation attacks</h1>\n"
msgid "<h1 id=\"correlation\">End-to-end correlation attacks</h1>\n"
msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"The Tor design doesn't try to protect against an attacker who can see or "
"measure both traffic going into the Tor network and also traffic coming out "
"of the Tor network. That's because if you can see both flows, some simple "
"statistics let you decide whether they match up."
"Tor is designed for low-latency communications: the time for a request to go "
"from your computer to the destination server and back is generally less than "
"1 second. Such a low latency makes it possible to use Tor for web browsing "
"and instant messaging."
msgstr ""
"Das Konzept von Tor versucht nicht vor Angreifenden zu schützen, die sowohl "
"in das Tor-Netz hineingehende, als auch daraus ausgehende übertragene Daten "
"sehen oder messen können. Daher kann man bei Kenntnis beider Datenflüsse "
"durch einfache Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung entscheiden, ob sie zusammen "
"passen."
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"That could also be the case if your ISP (or your local network "
"administrator) and the ISP of the destination server (or the destination "
"server itself) cooperate to attack you."
"As a consequence of Tor being designed for low-latency communications, an "
"attacker could in theory correlate the timing and shape of the traffic "
"entering and exiting the Tor network to deanonymize Tor users. Such attacks "
"are called *end-to-end correlation attacks*, because they require observing "
"both ends of a Tor circuit at the same time."
msgstr ""
"Dies ist auch möglich, wenn Ihr ISP (oder Administrator des lokalen "
"Netzwerks) und der ISP des Zielservers (oder der Zielserver selbst) bei "
"einem Angriff gegen Sie zusammenarbeiten."
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"Tor tries to protect against traffic analysis, where an attacker tries to "
"learn whom to investigate, but Tor can't protect against traffic "
"confirmation (also known as end-to-end correlation), where an attacker tries "
"to confirm a hypothesis by monitoring the right locations in the network and "
"then doing the math."
"For example, an ISP and a website could potentially collaborate to "
"deanonymize a Tor user by observing that the same particular network traffic "
"pattern enters the Tor network at the ISP and then reaches the website "
"shortly afterward."
msgstr ""
"Tor versucht dort vor Datenflussanalyse zu schützen, wo Angreifende "
"versuchen zu lernen, wer auszuforschen ist. Aber Tor kann nicht vor "
"Datenflussbestätigung (auch bekannt als Ende-zu-Ende Korrelation) schützen, "
"bei der Angreifende durch Beobachten der richtigen Stellen im Netzwerk und "
"anschließender mathematischer Auswertung, eine Annahme zu bestätigen "
"versuchen."
#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
msgid ""
"<p class=\"quoted-from\">Quoted from <a\n"
"href=\"https://blog.torproject.org/blog/one-cell-enough\">Tor Project: \"One cell\n"
"is enough to break Tor's anonymity\"</a>.</p>\n"
"End-to-end correlation attacks have been studied in many research papers but "
"we are not aware of any actual use to deanonymize Tor users. In the past, "
"law enforcement agencies preferred exploiting vulnerabilities in *Tor "
"Browser* and Tails to deanonymize users instead of performing end-to-end "
"correlation attacks."
msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"Tails protects better than *Tor Browser* from such software vulnerabilities "
"but does not protect better from end-to-end correlation attacks."
msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
msgid "See also:"
msgstr ""
#. type: Bullet: '- '
msgid ""
"[Tor Project: One cell is enough to break Tor's anonymity](https://blog."
"torproject.org/one-cell-enough-break-tors-anonymity) for an overview of the "
"academic research on end-to-end correlation attacks."
msgstr ""
#. type: Bullet: '- '
msgid ""
"[Ars Technica: Firefox 0-day in the wild is being used to attack Tor users]"
"(https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/11/firefox-0day-used-"
"against-tor-users-almost-identical-to-one-fbi-used-in-2013/) about a "
"software vulnerability in *Tor Browser* being exploited in 2016."
msgstr ""
#. type: Bullet: '- '
msgid ""
"[Vice: Facebook Helped the FBI Hack a Child Predator](https://www.vice.com/"
"en/article/v7gd9b/facebook-helped-fbi-hack-child-predator-buster-hernandez) "
"about a software vulnerability in Tails being exploited in 2017."
msgstr ""
"<p class=\"quoted-from\">Zitiert aus <a\n"
"href=\"https://blog.torproject.org/blog/one-cell-enough\">Tor Project: \"One cell\n"
"is enough to break Tor's anonymity\"</a>.</p>\n"
#. type: Plain text
#, fuzzy, no-wrap
......@@ -615,49 +632,6 @@ msgstr ""
"Beispielsweise beinhaltet Tails bereits den [Metadata anonymisation\n"
"toolkit](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2).\n"
#. type: Plain text
#, fuzzy, no-wrap
#| msgid "Tor doesn't protect you from a global adversary\n"
msgid "<h1 id=\"global-adversary\">Tor doesn't protect you from a global adversary</h1>\n"
msgstr "Tor schützt Sie nicht vor globalen Angreifenden\n"
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"A global passive adversary would be a person or an entity able to monitor at "
"the same time the traffic between all the computers in a network. By "
"studying, for example, the timing and volume patterns of the different "
"communications across the network, it would be statistically possible to "
"identify Tor circuits and thus match Tor users and destination servers."
msgstr ""
"Eine globale, passiv angreifende Partei wäre die Person oder Institution mit "
"der Fähigkeit, gleichzeitig den gesamten Datenverkehr aller Computer in "
"einem Netzwerk zu beobachten. Beispielsweise wäre es durch die Analyse von "
"Zeit- und Volumenmustern der unterschiedlichen Kommunikation im Netzwerk "
"statistisch möglich, Tor-Verbindungen zu identifizieren und so Tor-Nutzer "
"und Zielserver abzugleichen."
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"It is part of Tor's initial trade-off not to address such a threat in order "
"to create a low-latency communication service usable for web browsing, "
"Internet chat or SSH connections."
msgstr ""
"Es ist ein Teil der grundlegenden Abwägung in Tor, diese Bedrohung nicht zu "
"beachten, um einen Kommunikationsdienst mit niedriger Latenz für "
"Webbrowsing, Internet-Chat oder SSH-Verbindungen zu schaffen."
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"For more expert information see the Tor design paper, \"[Tor Project: The "
"Second-Generation Onion Router](https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/"
"design-paper/tor-design.pdf)\", specifically, \"Part 3. Design goals and "
"assumptions.\""
msgstr ""
"Für weiterführende Informationen lesen Sie das Tor-Entwurfspapier \"[Tor "
"Project: The Second-Generation Onion Router](https://svn.torproject.org/svn/"
"projects/design-paper/tor-design.pdf)\", vor allem \"Teil 3. Design goals "
"and assumptions\"."
#. type: Plain text
#, fuzzy, no-wrap
#| msgid "Tails doesn't magically separate your different contextual identities\n"
......@@ -785,6 +759,89 @@ msgstr ""
"Tails und die gesamte mitgelieferte Software werden ständig weiterentwickelt "
"und können Programmierfehler oder Sicherheitslücken enthalten."
#~ msgid ""
#~ "The Tor design doesn't try to protect against an attacker who can see or "
#~ "measure both traffic going into the Tor network and also traffic coming "
#~ "out of the Tor network. That's because if you can see both flows, some "
#~ "simple statistics let you decide whether they match up."
#~ msgstr ""
#~ "Das Konzept von Tor versucht nicht vor Angreifenden zu schützen, die "
#~ "sowohl in das Tor-Netz hineingehende, als auch daraus ausgehende "
#~ "übertragene Daten sehen oder messen können. Daher kann man bei Kenntnis "
#~ "beider Datenflüsse durch einfache Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung "
#~ "entscheiden, ob sie zusammen passen."
#~ msgid ""
#~ "That could also be the case if your ISP (or your local network "
#~ "administrator) and the ISP of the destination server (or the destination "
#~ "server itself) cooperate to attack you."
#~ msgstr ""
#~ "Dies ist auch möglich, wenn Ihr ISP (oder Administrator des lokalen "
#~ "Netzwerks) und der ISP des Zielservers (oder der Zielserver selbst) bei "
#~ "einem Angriff gegen Sie zusammenarbeiten."
#~ msgid ""
#~ "Tor tries to protect against traffic analysis, where an attacker tries to "
#~ "learn whom to investigate, but Tor can't protect against traffic "
#~ "confirmation (also known as end-to-end correlation), where an attacker "
#~ "tries to confirm a hypothesis by monitoring the right locations in the "
#~ "network and then doing the math."
#~ msgstr ""
#~ "Tor versucht dort vor Datenflussanalyse zu schützen, wo Angreifende "
#~ "versuchen zu lernen, wer auszuforschen ist. Aber Tor kann nicht vor "
#~ "Datenflussbestätigung (auch bekannt als Ende-zu-Ende Korrelation) "
#~ "schützen, bei der Angreifende durch Beobachten der richtigen Stellen im "
#~ "Netzwerk und anschließender mathematischer Auswertung, eine Annahme zu "
#~ "bestätigen versuchen."
#~ msgid ""
#~ "<p class=\"quoted-from\">Quoted from <a\n"
#~ "href=\"https://blog.torproject.org/blog/one-cell-enough\">Tor Project: \"One cell\n"
#~ "is enough to break Tor's anonymity\"</a>.</p>\n"
#~ msgstr ""
#~ "<p class=\"quoted-from\">Zitiert aus <a\n"
#~ "href=\"https://blog.torproject.org/blog/one-cell-enough\">Tor Project: \"One cell\n"
#~ "is enough to break Tor's anonymity\"</a>.</p>\n"
#, fuzzy
#~| msgid "Tor doesn't protect you from a global adversary\n"
#~ msgid "<h1 id=\"global-adversary\">Tor doesn't protect you from a global adversary</h1>\n"
#~ msgstr "Tor schützt Sie nicht vor globalen Angreifenden\n"
#~ msgid ""
#~ "A global passive adversary would be a person or an entity able to monitor "
#~ "at the same time the traffic between all the computers in a network. By "
#~ "studying, for example, the timing and volume patterns of the different "
#~ "communications across the network, it would be statistically possible to "
#~ "identify Tor circuits and thus match Tor users and destination servers."
#~ msgstr ""
#~ "Eine globale, passiv angreifende Partei wäre die Person oder Institution "
#~ "mit der Fähigkeit, gleichzeitig den gesamten Datenverkehr aller Computer "
#~ "in einem Netzwerk zu beobachten. Beispielsweise wäre es durch die Analyse "
#~ "von Zeit- und Volumenmustern der unterschiedlichen Kommunikation im "
#~ "Netzwerk statistisch möglich, Tor-Verbindungen zu identifizieren und so "
#~ "Tor-Nutzer und Zielserver abzugleichen."
#~ msgid ""
#~ "It is part of Tor's initial trade-off not to address such a threat in "
#~ "order to create a low-latency communication service usable for web "
#~ "browsing, Internet chat or SSH connections."
#~ msgstr ""
#~ "Es ist ein Teil der grundlegenden Abwägung in Tor, diese Bedrohung nicht "
#~ "zu beachten, um einen Kommunikationsdienst mit niedriger Latenz für "
#~ "Webbrowsing, Internet-Chat oder SSH-Verbindungen zu schaffen."
#~ msgid ""
#~ "For more expert information see the Tor design paper, \"[Tor Project: The "
#~ "Second-Generation Onion Router](https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/"
#~ "design-paper/tor-design.pdf)\", specifically, \"Part 3. Design goals and "
#~ "assumptions.\""
#~ msgstr ""
#~ "Für weiterführende Informationen lesen Sie das Tor-Entwurfspapier \"[Tor "
#~ "Project: The Second-Generation Onion Router](https://svn.torproject.org/"
#~ "svn/projects/design-paper/tor-design.pdf)\", vor allem \"Teil 3. Design "
#~ "goals and assumptions\"."
#~ msgid ""
#~ "It is usually not advisable to use the same Tails session to perform two "
#~ "tasks or endorse two contextual identities that you really want to keep "
......
......@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ msgid ""
msgstr ""
"Project-Id-Version: Tails\n"
"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: tails-l10n@boum.org\n"
"POT-Creation-Date: 2020-12-16 21:28+0000\n"
"POT-Creation-Date: 2020-12-17 19:36+0000\n"
"PO-Revision-Date: 2020-09-06 07:30+0000\n"
"Last-Translator: emmapeel <emma.peel@riseup.net>\n"
"Language-Team: Spanish <http://translate.tails.boum.org/projects/tails/"
......@@ -413,57 +413,76 @@ msgstr ""
"collusion</a>.</p>\n"
#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
msgid "<h1 id=\"confirmation\">Confirmation attacks</h1>\n"
#, fuzzy, no-wrap
#| msgid "<h1 id=\"confirmation\">Confirmation attacks</h1>\n"
msgid "<h1 id=\"correlation\">End-to-end correlation attacks</h1>\n"
msgstr "<h1 id=\"confirmation\">Ataques de confirmación</h1>\n"
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"The Tor design doesn't try to protect against an attacker who can see or "
"measure both traffic going into the Tor network and also traffic coming out "
"of the Tor network. That's because if you can see both flows, some simple "
"statistics let you decide whether they match up."
"Tor is designed for low-latency communications: the time for a request to go "
"from your computer to the destination server and back is generally less than "
"1 second. Such a low latency makes it possible to use Tor for web browsing "
"and instant messaging."
msgstr ""
"El diseño de Tor no intenta protegerte contra un atacante que puede ver o "
"medir tanto el tráfico que entra como el que sale de la red Tor. Eso es así "
"porque si puedes ver ambos movimientos, un par de estadísticas simples te "
"permiten saber si coinciden o no."
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"That could also be the case if your ISP (or your local network "
"administrator) and the ISP of the destination server (or the destination "
"server itself) cooperate to attack you."
"As a consequence of Tor being designed for low-latency communications, an "
"attacker could in theory correlate the timing and shape of the traffic "
"entering and exiting the Tor network to deanonymize Tor users. Such attacks "
"are called *end-to-end correlation attacks*, because they require observing "
"both ends of a Tor circuit at the same time."
msgstr ""
"Este podría ser el caso si tu ISP (o tu administrador de red local) y el ISP "
"del servidor de destino (o el propio servidor de destino) cooperan para "
"atacarte."
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"Tor tries to protect against traffic analysis, where an attacker tries to "
"learn whom to investigate, but Tor can't protect against traffic "
"confirmation (also known as end-to-end correlation), where an attacker tries "
"to confirm a hypothesis by monitoring the right locations in the network and "
"then doing the math."
"For example, an ISP and a website could potentially collaborate to "
"deanonymize a Tor user by observing that the same particular network traffic "
"pattern enters the Tor network at the ISP and then reaches the website "
"shortly afterward."
msgstr ""
"Tor intenta proteger contra el análisis de tráfico, en donde un atacante "
"trata de saber a quién investigar, pero no puede proteger contra la "
"confirmación de tráfico (también conocida como correlación de extremo a "
"extremo), donde un atacante intenta confirmar una hipótesis mediante el "
"seguimiento de las ubicaciones correctas en la red para luego hacer las "
"matemáticas."
#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
msgid ""
"<p class=\"quoted-from\">Quoted from <a\n"
"href=\"https://blog.torproject.org/blog/one-cell-enough\">Tor Project: \"One cell\n"
"is enough to break Tor's anonymity\"</a>.</p>\n"
"End-to-end correlation attacks have been studied in many research papers but "
"we are not aware of any actual use to deanonymize Tor users. In the past, "
"law enforcement agencies preferred exploiting vulnerabilities in *Tor "
"Browser* and Tails to deanonymize users instead of performing end-to-end "
"correlation attacks."
msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"Tails protects better than *Tor Browser* from such software vulnerabilities "
"but does not protect better from end-to-end correlation attacks."
msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
msgid "See also:"
msgstr ""
#. type: Bullet: '- '
msgid ""
"[Tor Project: One cell is enough to break Tor's anonymity](https://blog."
"torproject.org/one-cell-enough-break-tors-anonymity) for an overview of the "
"academic research on end-to-end correlation attacks."
msgstr ""
#. type: Bullet: '- '
msgid ""
"[Ars Technica: Firefox 0-day in the wild is being used to attack Tor users]"
"(https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/11/firefox-0day-used-"
"against-tor-users-almost-identical-to-one-fbi-used-in-2013/) about a "
"software vulnerability in *Tor Browser* being exploited in 2016."
msgstr ""
#. type: Bullet: '- '
msgid ""
"[Vice: Facebook Helped the FBI Hack a Child Predator](https://www.vice.com/"
"en/article/v7gd9b/facebook-helped-fbi-hack-child-predator-buster-hernandez) "
"about a software vulnerability in Tails being exploited in 2017."
msgstr ""
"<p class=\"quoted-from\">Citado de <a\n"
"href=\"https://blog.torproject.org/blog/one-cell-enough\">Tor Project: \"One cell\n"
"is enough to break Tor's anonymity\"</a>.</p>\n"
#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
......@@ -568,48 +587,6 @@ msgstr ""
"de los objetivos de diseño de Tails ayudarte a hacer eso. Por ejemplo, Tails ya viene con\n"
"el [Metadata anonymisation toolkit](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2).\n"
#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
msgid "<h1 id=\"global-adversary\">Tor doesn't protect you from a global adversary</h1>\n"
msgstr "<h1 id=\"global-adversary\">Tor no te protege de un adversario global</h1>\n"
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"A global passive adversary would be a person or an entity able to monitor at "
"the same time the traffic between all the computers in a network. By "
"studying, for example, the timing and volume patterns of the different "
"communications across the network, it would be statistically possible to "
"identify Tor circuits and thus match Tor users and destination servers."
msgstr ""
"Un adversario pasivo global sería una persona o una entidad capaz de "
"monitorear al mismo tiempo el tráfico entre todos los ordenadores de una "
"red. Al estudiar, por ejemplo, los patrones de tiempos y volúmenes de las "
"diferentes comunicaciones a través de la red, sería estadísticamente posible "
"identificar los circuitos Tor y, por lo tanto, lograr coincidir los usuarios "
"de Tor con los servidores de destino."
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"It is part of Tor's initial trade-off not to address such a threat in order "
"to create a low-latency communication service usable for web browsing, "
"Internet chat or SSH connections."
msgstr ""
"Es parte de la compensación inicial de Tor no abordar tal amenaza con el fin "
"de crear un servicio de comunicación de baja latencia utilizable para "
"navegación web, chat por Internet o conexiones SSH."
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"For more expert information see the Tor design paper, \"[Tor Project: The "
"Second-Generation Onion Router](https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/"
"design-paper/tor-design.pdf)\", specifically, \"Part 3. Design goals and "
"assumptions.\""
msgstr ""
"Para obtener más información técnica, consulta el documento de diseño de Tor "
"(en inglés), \"[Tor Project: The Second-Generation Onion Router](https://svn."
"torproject.org/svn/projects/design-paper/tor-design.pdf)\", específicamente, "
"\"Part 3. Design goals and assumptions.\""
#. type: Plain text
#, fuzzy, no-wrap
#| msgid "<h1 id=\"identities\">Tails doesn't magically separate your different contextual identities</h1>\n"
......@@ -735,6 +712,86 @@ msgstr ""
"Tails, así como todo el software que incluye, está en continuo desarrollo y "
"puede contener errores de programación o agujeros de seguridad."
#~ msgid ""
#~ "The Tor design doesn't try to protect against an attacker who can see or "
#~ "measure both traffic going into the Tor network and also traffic coming "
#~ "out of the Tor network. That's because if you can see both flows, some "
#~ "simple statistics let you decide whether they match up."
#~ msgstr ""
#~ "El diseño de Tor no intenta protegerte contra un atacante que puede ver o "
#~ "medir tanto el tráfico que entra como el que sale de la red Tor. Eso es "
#~ "así porque si puedes ver ambos movimientos, un par de estadísticas "
#~ "simples te permiten saber si coinciden o no."
#~ msgid ""
#~ "That could also be the case if your ISP (or your local network "
#~ "administrator) and the ISP of the destination server (or the destination "
#~ "server itself) cooperate to attack you."
#~ msgstr ""
#~ "Este podría ser el caso si tu ISP (o tu administrador de red local) y el "
#~ "ISP del servidor de destino (o el propio servidor de destino) cooperan "
#~ "para atacarte."
#~ msgid ""
#~ "Tor tries to protect against traffic analysis, where an attacker tries to "
#~ "learn whom to investigate, but Tor can't protect against traffic "
#~ "confirmation (also known as end-to-end correlation), where an attacker "
#~ "tries to confirm a hypothesis by monitoring the right locations in the "
#~ "network and then doing the math."
#~ msgstr ""
#~ "Tor intenta proteger contra el análisis de tráfico, en donde un atacante "
#~ "trata de saber a quién investigar, pero no puede proteger contra la "
#~ "confirmación de tráfico (también conocida como correlación de extremo a "
#~ "extremo), donde un atacante intenta confirmar una hipótesis mediante el "
#~ "seguimiento de las ubicaciones correctas en la red para luego hacer las "
#~ "matemáticas."
#~ msgid ""
#~ "<p class=\"quoted-from\">Quoted from <a\n"
#~ "href=\"https://blog.torproject.org/blog/one-cell-enough\">Tor Project: \"One cell\n"
#~ "is enough to break Tor's anonymity\"</a>.</p>\n"
#~ msgstr ""
#~ "<p class=\"quoted-from\">Citado de <a\n"
#~ "href=\"https://blog.torproject.org/blog/one-cell-enough\">Tor Project: \"One cell\n"
#~ "is enough to break Tor's anonymity\"</a>.</p>\n"
#~ msgid "<h1 id=\"global-adversary\">Tor doesn't protect you from a global adversary</h1>\n"
#~ msgstr "<h1 id=\"global-adversary\">Tor no te protege de un adversario global</h1>\n"
#~ msgid ""
#~ "A global passive adversary would be a person or an entity able to monitor "
#~ "at the same time the traffic between all the computers in a network. By "
#~ "studying, for example, the timing and volume patterns of the different "
#~ "communications across the network, it would be statistically possible to "
#~ "identify Tor circuits and thus match Tor users and destination servers."
#~ msgstr ""
#~ "Un adversario pasivo global sería una persona o una entidad capaz de "
#~ "monitorear al mismo tiempo el tráfico entre todos los ordenadores de una "
#~ "red. Al estudiar, por ejemplo, los patrones de tiempos y volúmenes de las "
#~ "diferentes comunicaciones a través de la red, sería estadísticamente "
#~ "posible identificar los circuitos Tor y, por lo tanto, lograr coincidir "
#~ "los usuarios de Tor con los servidores de destino."
#~ msgid ""
#~ "It is part of Tor's initial trade-off not to address such a threat in "
#~ "order to create a low-latency communication service usable for web "
#~ "browsing, Internet chat or SSH connections."
#~ msgstr ""
#~ "Es parte de la compensación inicial de Tor no abordar tal amenaza con el "
#~ "fin de crear un servicio de comunicación de baja latencia utilizable para "
#~ "navegación web, chat por Internet o conexiones SSH."
#~ msgid ""
#~ "For more expert information see the Tor design paper, \"[Tor Project: The "
#~ "Second-Generation Onion Router](https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/"
#~ "design-paper/tor-design.pdf)\", specifically, \"Part 3. Design goals and "
#~ "assumptions.\""
#~ msgstr ""
#~ "Para obtener más información técnica, consulta el documento de diseño de "
#~ "Tor (en inglés), \"[Tor Project: The Second-Generation Onion Router]"
#~ "(https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/design-paper/tor-design.pdf)\", "
#~ "específicamente, \"Part 3. Design goals and assumptions.\""
#~ msgid ""
#~ "It is usually not advisable to use the same Tails session to perform two "
#~ "tasks or endorse two contextual identities that you really want to keep "
......
......@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ msgid ""
msgstr ""
"Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n"
"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: tails-l10n@boum.org\n"
"POT-Creation-Date: 2020-12-16 21:28+0000\n"
"POT-Creation-Date: 2020-12-17 19:36+0000\n"
"PO-Revision-Date: 2015-10-15 12:19+0000\n"
"Last-Translator: sprint5 <translation5@451f.org>\n"
"Language-Team: Persian <http://weblate.451f.org:8889/projects/tails/warning/"
......@@ -465,60 +465,74 @@ msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
msgid "<h1 id=\"confirmation\">Confirmation attacks</h1>\n"
msgid "<h1 id=\"correlation\">End-to-end correlation attacks</h1>\n"
msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"The Tor design doesn't try to protect against an attacker who can see or "
"measure both traffic going into the Tor network and also traffic coming out "
"of the Tor network. That's because if you can see both flows, some simple "
"statistics let you decide whether they match up."
"Tor is designed for low-latency communications: the time for a request to go "
"from your computer to the destination server and back is generally less than "
"1 second. Such a low latency makes it possible to use Tor for web browsing "
"and instant messaging."
msgstr ""
"طراحی تور در راستای حمایت در برابر مهاجمی نیست که می‌تواند ترافیک ورودی به "
"شبکهٔ تور و ترافیک خروجی از آن را ببیند یا بسنجد. چرا که اگر بتوانید هر دو "
"جریان را ببینید با آمارهایی ساده می‌توانید از آن‌ها سر دربیاورید."
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"That could also be the case if your ISP (or your local network "
"administrator) and the ISP of the destination server (or the destination "
"server itself) cooperate to attack you."
"As a consequence of Tor being designed for low-latency communications, an "
"attacker could in theory correlate the timing and shape of the traffic "
"entering and exiting the Tor network to deanonymize Tor users. Such attacks "
"are called *end-to-end correlation attacks*, because they require observing "
"both ends of a Tor circuit at the same time."
msgstr ""
"این مساله در مورد همدستی ارائه‌دهندهٔ خدمات اینترنتی شما (یا مدیر شبکهٔ "
"محلی‌تان) با ارائه‌دهندهٔ خدمات اینترنتی سرور مقصد (یا خود سرور مقصد) برای حمله "
"به شما نیز صادق است."
#. type: Plain text
#, fuzzy
#| msgid ""
#| "Tor tries to protect against traffic analysis, where an attacker tries to "
#| "learn whom to investigate, but Tor can't protect against traffic "
#| "confirmation (also known as end-to-end correlation), where an attacker "
#| "tries to confirm an hypothesis by monitoring the right locations in the "
#| "network and then doing the math."
msgid ""
"Tor tries to protect against traffic analysis, where an attacker tries to "
"learn whom to investigate, but Tor can't protect against traffic "
"confirmation (also known as end-to-end correlation), where an attacker tries "
"to confirm a hypothesis by monitoring the right locations in the network and "
"then doing the math."
"For example, an ISP and a website could potentially collaborate to "
"deanonymize a Tor user by observing that the same particular network traffic "
"pattern enters the Tor network at the ISP and then reaches the website "
"shortly afterward."
msgstr ""
"تور تلاش می‌کند خود را در برابر تحلیل ترافیک یعنی تلاش یک مهاجم برای پیدا "
"کردن فردی برای بررسی محافظت کند، اما تور نمی‌تواند خود را در برابر تأیید "
"ترافیک (یا همان تناظر یک‌به‌یک) محافظت کند؛ در این حمله یک مهاجم سعی می‌کند با "
"زیر نظر گرفتن مکان‌های مناسب در شبکه و بررسی ریاضی یک فرضیه را تأیید کند."
#. type: Plain text
#, no-wrap
msgid ""
"<p class=\"quoted-from\">Quoted from <a\n"
"href=\"https://blog.torproject.org/blog/one-cell-enough\">Tor Project: \"One cell\n"
"is enough to break Tor's anonymity\"</a>.</p>\n"
"End-to-end correlation attacks have been studied in many research papers but "
"we are not aware of any actual use to deanonymize Tor users. In the past, "
"law enforcement agencies preferred exploiting vulnerabilities in *Tor "
"Browser* and Tails to deanonymize users instead of performing end-to-end "
"correlation attacks."
msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
msgid ""
"Tails protects better than *Tor Browser* from such software vulnerabilities "
"but does not protect better from end-to-end correlation attacks."
msgstr ""
#. type: Plain text
msgid "See also:"
msgstr ""
#. type: Bullet: '- '
msgid ""
"[Tor Project: One cell is enough to break Tor's anonymity](https://blog."
"torproject.org/one-cell-enough-break-tors-anonymity) for an overview of the "
"academic research on end-to-end correlation attacks."
msgstr ""
#. type: Bullet: '- '
msgid ""
"[Ars Technica: Firefox 0-day in the wild is being used to attack Tor users]"
"(https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/11/firefox-0day-used-"
"against-tor-users-almost-identical-to-one-fbi-used-in-2013/) about a "
"software vulnerability in *Tor Browser* being exploited in 2016."
msgstr ""
#. type: Bullet: '- '
msgid ""
"[Vice: Facebook Helped the FBI Hack a Child Predator](https://www.vice.com/"
"en/article/v7gd9b/facebook-helped-fbi-hack-child-predator-buster-hernandez) "
"about a software vulnerability in Tails being exploited in 2017."
msgstr ""
"<p class=\"quoted-from\">برگرفته از <a\n"
"href=\"https://blog.torproject.org/blog/one-cell-enough\">پروژهٔ تور:\n"
"برای به خطر انداختن ناشناسی در تور یک سلول کافی است\"</a>.</p>\n"
#. type: Plain text
#, fuzzy, no-wrap
......@@ -655,58 +669,6 @@ msgstr ""
"که به شما برای انجام این کار کمک کند. برای نمونه تیلز دارای یک \n"
"[جعبه‌ابزار ناشناس‌سازی متاداده](https://0xacab.org/jvoisin/mat2) است.\n"
#. type: Plain text
#, fuzzy, no-wrap
#| msgid "Tor doesn't protect you from a global adversary\n"
msgid "<h1 id=\"global-adversary\">Tor doesn't protect you from a global adversary</h1>\n"
msgstr "تور از شما در برابر یک دشمن جهانی محافظت نمی‌کند\n"
#. type: Plain text