Merge remote-tracking branch 'xin/bugfix/16354-usb-doc-update' into feature/15292-usb-image

wiki/src/doc/about/openpgp_keys/signing_key_revocation.mdwn

@@ -133,11 +133,11 @@ interest of Tails.
 The bad things that could happen if the mechanism fails are:
 
 A. The signing key is not revoked while it should be. This could allow
-possible attackers to distribute malicious Tails ISO images or publish
+possible attackers to distribute malicious Tails images or publish
 malicious information on our name.
 
 B. The signing key is revoked when it should not have been. This would
-prevent people from verifying our ISO images with OpenPGP until we
+prevent people from verifying our images with OpenPGP until we
 publish a new signing key.
 
 Distribution of the shares

wiki/src/doc/about/trust.mdwn

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ receive it. Hence a thorough audit of the code can reveal if any
 malicious code, like a backdoor, is present. Furthermore, with the
 source code it is possible to build the software, and then compare the
 result against any version that is already built and being
-distributed, like the Tails ISO images that you can download from
+distributed, like the Tails images that you can download from
 us. That way it can be determined whether the distributed
 version actually was built with the source code, or if any malicious
 changes have been made.

wiki/src/doc/first_steps/upgrade.mdwn

@@ -40,9 +40,9 @@ The advantages of this technique are the following:
 
   - You only need a single Tails USB stick. The upgrade is done on the fly from a
     running Tails. After upgrading, you can restart and use the new version.
-  - The upgrade is much smaller to download than a full ISO image.
+  - The upgrade is much smaller to download than a full USB image.
   - The upgrade mechanism includes cryptographic verification of the upgrade.
-    You don't have to verify the ISO image yourself anymore.
+    You don't have to verify the USB image yourself anymore.
 
 Requirements:
 

wiki/src/install/expert/usb.mdwn

@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ Install Tails using <span class="command">dd</span>
 
    You should get something like this:
 
-   <p class="pre command-example">dd if=/home/user/tails-amd64-3.0.iso of=/dev/sdb bs=16M && sync</p>
+   <p class="pre command-example">dd if=/home/user/tails-amd64-3.12.img of=/dev/sdb bs=16M && sync</p>
 
    If no error message is returned, Tails is being copied on the USB
    stick. The copy takes some time, generally a few minutes.

wiki/src/support/faq.es.po

@@ -1597,11 +1597,11 @@ msgstr ""
 msgid ""
 "To verify the integrity of a DVD from a separate trusted system, you can "
 "verify the signature of the ISO image as documented in [[verify the ISO "
-"image using OpenPGP|install/download#openpgp]] against the DVD itself."
+"image using OpenPGP|install/download-iso#openpgp]] against the DVD itself."
 msgstr ""
 "Para verificar la integridad de un DVD desde un sistema confiado separado, "
 "puedes verificar la firma de la imagen ISO como está documentado en "
-"[[verifica la imagen ISO usando OpenPGP|install/download#openpgp]] al DVD "
+"[[verifica la imagen ISO usando OpenPGP|install/download-iso#openpgp]] al DVD "
 "mismo."
 
 #. type: Bullet: '- '

wiki/src/support/faq.fr.po

@@ -1626,11 +1626,11 @@ msgstr ""
 msgid ""
 "To verify the integrity of a DVD from a separate trusted system, you can "
 "verify the signature of the ISO image as documented in [[verify the ISO "
-"image using OpenPGP|install/download#openpgp]] against the DVD itself."
+"image using OpenPGP|install/download-iso#openpgp]] against the DVD itself."
 msgstr ""
 "Pour vérifier l'intégrité d'un DVD depuis un système de confiance séparé, "
 "vous pouvez vérifier la signature de l'image ISO comme documenté dans "
-"[[vérifier l'image ISO en utilisant OpenPGP|install/download#openpgp]]."
+"[[vérifier l'image ISO en utilisant OpenPGP|install/download-iso#openpgp]]."
 
 #. type: Bullet: '- '
 msgid ""

wiki/src/support/faq.it.po

@@ -1578,11 +1578,11 @@ msgstr ""
 msgid ""
 "To verify the integrity of a DVD from a separate trusted system, you can "
 "verify the signature of the ISO image as documented in [[verify the ISO "
-"image using OpenPGP|install/download#openpgp]] against the DVD itself."
+"image using OpenPGP|install/download-iso#openpgp]] against the DVD itself."
 msgstr ""
 "Per verificare l'integrità di un DVD da un sistema di fiducia separato, è "
 "possibile verificare la firma dell'immagine ISO come documentato in "
-"[[verificare l'immagine ISO utilizzando OpenPGP|install/download#openpgp]] "
+"[[verificare l'immagine ISO utilizzando OpenPGP|install/download-iso#openpgp]] "
 "rispetto al DVD stesso."
 
 #. type: Bullet: '- '

wiki/src/support/faq.mdwn

@@ -511,7 +511,7 @@ the intended use cases, and the assumptions on which Tails is based.
 We also try to limit the amount of software included in Tails, and we only add
 new software with a very good reason to do so:
 
-  - We try to limit the growth of the ISO image and automatic upgrades.
+  - We try to limit the growth of the images and automatic upgrades.
   - More software implies more security issues.
   - We avoid proposing several options to accomplish the same task.
   - If a package needs to be removed after its inclusion, for example because of
@@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ liar; the answer of a true liar would always be "no".
 
 - To verify the integrity of a DVD from a separate trusted system, you can
   verify the signature of the ISO image as documented in [[verify the ISO image
-  using OpenPGP|install/download#openpgp]]
+  using OpenPGP|install/download-iso#openpgp]]
   against the DVD itself.
 
 - There is no documented method of verifying the integrity of a Tails USB stick