Commit 106a9835 authored by T(A)ILS developers's avatar T(A)ILS developers
Browse files

Design draft: add a bunch of todo items.

Thanks to for suggesting this all.
parent 28d61d97
......@@ -35,6 +35,17 @@ Other design documents:
review process quicker
* the *Reproducibility* section is probably worth merging in the
- be more explicit about the post-mortem forensics issue. There might
not be much to say but I think that it should at least be mentioned
in the requirements, part 2:
* What is required for a PELD to prevent from post-mortem analysis?
* How do we think this should be provided?
- More generally this whole post-mortem analysis thingie is the real
difference to put forward while talking to the Tor people; bringing
their privacy concerns further than just the Internet connection.
You can be a Tor freak and get the same Tor configuration as T(A)ILS
on your own system but you won't get the same post-mortem analysis
# 1 Introduction
......@@ -128,7 +139,7 @@ attackers.
- **Eavesdrop on sensitive data**: The Tor network only prevents the
data from being traced (according to Tor's threat model) but does not
protect it from eavesdropping.
- **Post-mortem user activity and sensitive data recovery**:
- **Post-mortem user activity and sensitive data recovery (forensics)**:
"Normal" operating systems keep a lot of traces about their users'
Internet activities (notably browser cache and cookies) on local
storage media; similarly, working on a sensitive document with a
......@@ -673,9 +684,18 @@ conversations being as private and unrecordable as possible. A script
generates at each boot a random nick to be used on the preconfigured IRC
### 3.5.12 Host system swap
**FIXME**: explain T(A)ILS does its best not to use any swap partition
that could be found at runtime:
- not using live-boot's swapon option
- config/chroot_local-hooks/03-noswap
- config/chroot_local-hooks/05-disable_swapon
### 3.5.13 Host system RAM
**FIXME: mention this is currently sometimes buggy and not to be relied on (yet)**
**FIXME: mention this is currently sometimes buggy and not to be relied on (yet)**
When shutting down the system RAM is securely wiped. RAM can actually
be read after the machine shuts off with the right equipment. The
......@@ -688,7 +708,20 @@ or simply turn it off if you are not worried about this attack.
- [[!tails_live-boot_gitweb debian/live-boot.init]]
### 3.5.14 Passwords
### 3.5.14 Host system disks and partitions
**FIXME**: some LiveDistros read the disks and possibly mount the
available partitions automatically. T(A)ILS does not do so for fixed
Hints to the one who will write this part:
- grep nopersistent config/amnesia
- probably a few GConf settings in
- udev / GNOME / udisks: removable vs. fixed
### 3.5.15 Passwords
There are two users that are intended to be used for logins, `amnesia`
and `root`. Both have `amnesia` set as a password, and the `amnesia`
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