persistent_Tor_state.md

-[[!toc levels=3]]
+
+[[_TOC_]]
+
 
 # Big picture
 
-This is about [[!tails_ticket 5462]].
+This is about tails/tails#5462.
 
 There are a few good reasons for making Tor's data directory
 persistent:
@@ -29,8 +31,8 @@ a persistence preset for it.
 
 * Using persistent Entry Guard(s) [is a problem for mobile
   users](https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-October/025975.html),
-  as it gives attackers some bits for AdvGoalTracking (see [[the MAC
-  address spoofing design documentation|contribute/design/MAC_address]]),
+  as it gives attackers some bits for AdvGoalTracking (see [the MAC
+  address spoofing design documentation](https://tails.boum.org/contribute/design/MAC_address)),
   even if this is less severe than it used to be, thanks
   to the move to a single Entry Guard. We want to protect users
   against AdvGoalTracking, including versions thereof where the
@@ -372,7 +374,7 @@ Prerequisites: this can happen only once we don't rely anymore on the
 fact that certain files in `/var/lib/tor` are not persistent.
 More specifically:
 
-* [[!tails_ticket 5774]] needs to be resolved (our time syncing script
+* tails/tails#5774 needs to be resolved (our time syncing script
   uses the existence of `cached-descriptors` as a test for whether Tor
   is working, and a similar assumption is made for the
   `*-consensus` files;
@@ -439,7 +441,7 @@ Finally, we seed the Tor PRNG with:
 Note that Entry Guard(s) selection depends on the current state of the
 Tor network, and not only on how the Tor PRNG has been seeded.
 
-See [[!tor_bug 2653]] for further ideas on this topic.
+See [bug #2653 on Tor Project's Trac](https://bugs.torproject.org/2653) for further ideas on this topic.
 
 <a id="drawbacks"></a>
 
@@ -527,8 +529,7 @@ feature, hence:
     habits now.
 
 * We have considered requesting user input _once_, both to
-  parameterize Entry Guard selection, and for [[!tails_ticket
-  desc="seeding the entropy pool" 7675]]. This was discarded since the
+  parameterize Entry Guard selection, and for seeding the entropy pool (tails/tails#7675). This was discarded since the
   entropy pool seed should ideally contain, well, quite some entropy,
   while the requested user input for Entry Guard selection should be
   short, easy to type and to remember.
@@ -559,4 +560,5 @@ feature, hence:
   randomly." (source: *Why MAC Address Randomization is not Enough:
   An Analysis of Wi-Fi Network Discovery Mechanisms*)
 
-* How is this impacted by the changes brought by [[!tor_bug 12600]]?
+* How is this impacted by the changes brought by [bug #12600 on Tor Project's Trac](https://bugs.torproject.org/12600)?
+