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[[!tag archived]]
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[[!toc levels=4]]
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See also:
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* the [[corresponding design document|contribute/design/incremental_upgrades]];
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* the tickets with the _C: Upgrader_ label on [[!tails_gitlab "" desc="GitLab"]].
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# Random ideas for future improvements
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These are not worth creating tickets yet, as it's not even clear these
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changes are useful enough to put time in it.
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### Packaging could be more self-contained
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Move `/etc/sudoers.d/zzz_upgrade` and IUK-related user creation from
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the Tails main Git repository to the `tails-iuk` Debian package, so
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that it's more self-contained and easier to test.
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### Button for aborting upgrade cleanly
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### Compute and display ETA
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### Multi-step incremental upgrade
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E.g. 0.11 boots after 0.11.1 and 0.11.2 are out. Tails fetches
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https://tails.boum.org/upgrade/v1/Tails/0.11/i386/stable/upgrades.yml,
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that shall contain an incremental upgrade path with two target files:
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the 0.11 to 0.11.1 IUK, and the 0.11.1 to 0.11.2 IUK. The upgrader
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would download these two files and install the two IUKs in the
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correct order.
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### sharing upgrade material
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Once the incremental upgrade has been applied, I may be proposed to
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save a copy of the target files to a location of my choosing.
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### allow one to download target files in the clear
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The downloader program could provide an opt-in way to have the
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download happen in the clear, that is without going through the Tor
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network. It looks doable given it's a separate process: we may run it
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as a dedicated user, and reuse the `clearnet` infrastructure
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implemented for the Unsafe Browser.
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[[!tails_ticket 7878]]
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### "Retry with new circuit" button
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Circuit throughput varies wildly, and since this is a large download,
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it'll quickly wear out users' patience if a bad circuit is picked.
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Or maybe this can happen behind the scenes, e.g.: Automatically
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switch circuit every X minutes or Y% progress? That could even make
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fingerprinting the download on the Tor client <-> Entry Node side of
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the pipe a bit more difficult, for whatever that's worth.
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### Surviving key compromise
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* https://wiki.ubuntu.com/ImageBasedUpgrades/GPG |