Commit b8a3eede authored by samueldibella's avatar samueldibella
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Incorporated recommended changes from...

Incorporated recommended changes from tails/tails#17882 (comment 161104)
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......@@ -231,28 +231,35 @@ For more expert information see the Tor design paper, "[Tor Project: The Second-
Router](https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/design-paper/tor-design.pdf)",
specifically, "Part 3. Design goals and assumptions."
<h1 id="identities">Use Tails for one activity at a time</h1>
<h1 id="identities">Use Tails sessions for one purpose at a time</h1>
For example, don't use the same Tails session to both check your email and
anonymously publish a document, especially if those tasks use the same website
or you are using Tails [[Persistent Storage|doc/first_steps/persistence/]].
That is, unless you're OK with those two activities being correlatable.
For example, don't use the same Tails session to both check your work email and
anonymously publish a document. That is, unless you're OK with an adversary being able to correlate those tasks.
Tails and the Tor Browser naturally connect to different sites via different [[circuits in the Tor network|doc/anonymous_internet/tor_status]].
Adversaries could relate different tasks done in a Tails session by:
* Analyzing your Tor circuits
* Gaining access to your [[Persistent Storage|doc/first_steps/persistence/]]
## Tor circuits
Tails and the Tor Browser naturally connect to different websites via different [[circuits in the Tor network|doc/anonymous_internet/tor_status]].
But if you connect to the same website several times in one session,
like logging into two accounts on the same social media site, Tails and the Tor Browser
will use the same circuit, and all the activity on that site could be linked by an adversary.
If you use multiple programs to connect to the Internet, you can restart Tails or,
if you're just using the Tor Browser, you can use its [[**New Identity** button|anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser]]
to ensure you're using new Tor circuits.
If you use Tails Persistent Storage, you can prevent stored information from being linked
to other activities by switching between several USB drives that run Tails.
That way the Persistent Storage of, say, your activist email can be kept separate
from your use of Tails for work. We also recommend this step if you are worried about
someone gaining physical access to your computer or USB drives, or if you have to use Tails on an insecure or public computer.
For more about how Tor does or does not preserve anonymity, please see the [Tor Project's documentation](https://support.torproject.org/#staying-anonymous).
like logging into two accounts on the same social media website, Tails and the Tor Browser
use the same circuit, and all the activity on that website could be linked by an adversary.
To ensure you use new Tor circuits for Internet traffic:
* if you just use the Tor Browser, you can click its [[**New Identity** button|anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser]] to create a new circuit, or
* if you use multiple programs to connect to the Internet, you can restart Tails.
## Persistent Storage
You can prevent Persistent Storage information from being linked
to other activities by switching between several USB sticks that run Tails.
That way the Persistent Storage of, say, your activist email in Thunderbird can be kept separate
from your use of Tails for work.
We also recommend this step if you worry about
someone gaining physical access to your computer or USB sticks, or if you have to use Tails on an insecure or public computer (although [[Tails can't protect against compromised hardware|/doc/about/warning.html#compromised_hardware]]).
For more about how Tor does or does not preserve anonymity, see the [Tor Project's documentation](https://support.torproject.org/#staying-anonymous).
<h1 id="passwords">Tails doesn't make your crappy passwords stronger</h1>
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