Commit 4136ba36 authored by's avatar Committed by amnesia
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......@@ -59,6 +59,12 @@ EOF
>> TBB protects you from global adversaries better, yes giving much more (but) unidentifiable information to them. For example, I'm browsing for hours on TBB and there's no cookie from google or else. They will show you ads, they will see one Tor user visited that page, but cannot know who you are, you're also not a Tails user anymore :) (This is completely about the success of design, if you think something's wrong, contact them) If you know what you're doing, you enjoy a bigger anonymity set. And I still wonder the percentage of Tails users, it is not that easy to say I'm choosing to be one of the Tails users (The difference is surely quite big). Let's try not to create a different Tor network, but join to the current biggest one.
>>> ----- Indeed, we've gone a full circle. To sum it up: TPO puts politics before users (OK flamebait). Because they have more users Tails HAS to follow regardless of whether this is what people want, whether it is the right thing and whether this affects anonymity in a critical enough way to warrant this decision.
>>> I propose: You want the change, you document how "bad" adblocking really affects anonymity.
>>> You'll have to discern between custom and default filters. One can leave a unique fingerpring (devastatingly dangerous? No, the unique fingerprint affects only single domains and govs need to subpoena every one of them, no dragnet surveillance possible! - still bad) and default filters (does it negatively impact anonymity when just a few 1000 users have this set of filters? I doubt it, they still have the full pool of Tor users to sort through! Or do you think they monitor everyone who downloaded Tails?) If you disagree, prove it! Tails obviously should recommend not to edit any filters by hand. (btw the same applies to https-everywhere in TBB). EOF
(Question: Also, I never used any other language in Tails, do they have specialized headers for their languages? Or is it only the localization of programs etc. I currently cannot use Tails to check it)
>>> Privacy is totally unrelated from unlinkability. The better term to use here would be "anonymity set reduction". Reduction is always bad, it lessens the quality of anonymity. Ideally all Tor users would have the same fingerprint. But the anonymity set isn't the only criteria and if the Tails set is large enough and there are good reasons to deviate from TB this trade off could improve the overall anonymity. One such tradeoff (between anonymity set and security) worth making would be disabling JS by default, but then there is the tradeoff between usability and security to consider as well!
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